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This thesis explores whether there is a uniquely Japanese method of conflict 
management.  Given the delicate balance of stability in Northeast Asia, Japanese 
leadership needs to use conflict management tools to resolve territorial claims with the 
governments of China, Russia, and South Korea.  Given its desire to be a world leader, 
peaceful settlement of these disputes can enhance Japan’s image in the world. 
Japanese leaders, in the pre-modern era, had adapted Confucian principles of 
consensus building, order, and harmony to ensure peaceful coexistence.  In an effort to be 
like the West in the late 19th century, late Tokugawa and early Meiji leaders began to 
copy western ideas concerning what it meant to be a nation which included claiming 
territory and even going to war to maintain sovereignty interests.  In the post-World War 
II era, Japan was able to return to a more “harmonious” existence and by dealing with its 
territorial disputes through economic means.  Japanese policy makers developed its 
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The end of World War II left a series of territorial disputes that threaten the 
stability and security of Northeast Asia.  In 1998, Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of 
State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, listed maritime disputes as one of the top three 
“important challenges to U.S. security policy in the region,” preceded only by Korean 
unification and a rising economic and military threat from China.  He went on to say, 
“Recent tensions over these conflicting claims have led to an outpouring of nationalistic 
emotion on all sides, which could preface a future clash among our friends and allies if 
matters are left unresolved.”1  Given the delicate balance of stability in the region, 
Japanese policy makers need to use conflict management theory to resolve these 
contending disputes.  This thesis determines if Japan has a uniquely Japanese method of 
conflict management and if so, whether it will help settle its own territorial disputes.  The 
thesis will also examine the territorial disputes Japan is having with the governments of 
China, Russia, and South Korea.  
Research for this topic yielded many sources of information, but none of them 
provided a comprehensive study to address the issue of conflict management in Northeast 
Asia, let alone Japan.  Additionally, there does not seem to be a Japanese specific theory 
of conflict management.  This seems odd considering territorial disputes are not unique to 
the current security setting.  Japanese documents addresses conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution in Southeast Asia (Sabah, the South China Sea, Cambodia 
and East Timor, to name a few), however, there are no documents delineating how or 
why the Japanese government is managing its existing territorial disputes.  Japan’s 
Diplomatic Bluebook 2000 outlines recommendations for preventing conflict in Southeast 
Asia.2  However, there is no discernable overarching policy on conflict management for 
the Northeast Asian region.  This thesis formulates a Japanese specific theory concerning 
                                                 
1 Roth, Stanley O., East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Relations Committee, 7 May 1998, 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980507_roth_eastasia.html, 27 May 01. 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2000, Toward the 21st Century-Foreign Policy for a 
Better Future,  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/, 27 May 01.  [herein cited: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2000] 
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conflict management, as well as how Japanese leaders might exercise these methods in 
settling its territorial disputes.  Peaceful settlement of these disputes can only enhance 
Japan’s standing in the world given its desires to be a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council.   
The thesis will be divided into four subsequent chapters: Conflict Management: 
Western Theory and Japanese Historical Foundation; Western Influence on Japanese 
Conflict Management: Case Study of Japan’s Territorial Disputes; The Impact of Japan’s 
Conflict Management Style in Japanese Foreign Policy; and Conclusion.  The second 
chapter will tackle the theoretical aspects of conflict management.  It will evaluate 
western perspectives on contending worldviews, conflict management theory, to include 
approaches to conflict and cooperation, and the impact of the United Nations in conflict 
management.  Additionally, this chapter will use a historical survey to examine conflict 
management from a Japanese perspective.  Once this theoretical framework is laid out, 
chapter three will conduct a survey of Japan’s territorial disputes will be undertaken, 
followed by the Cold War and post-Cold War economic and political ramifications of 
Japan’s economic policy.  Having delved into this contentious territorial dispute in 
Northeast Asia, it would be fitting in chapter four to examine Japan’s overall foreign 
policy within the scope of its method of conflict management.  The final chapter will 
summarize the existing Japanese view of conflict management, make recommendations 
concerning the territorial disputes, as well as comment on a foreign policy direction for 
Japan and its prospects for the future. 
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II. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: WESTERN THEORY AND 
JAPANESE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION  
The West has many theoretical writings on the subject of conflict management.  
Initially, this chapter will be a survey of some contending international relations theories 
on worldviews, conflict management, and cooperation as well as a look at the western 
developed United Nations on managing and resolving conflicts.  Conversely, Japanese 
literature has few theoretical works on the subject.  Consequently, its “theory” will be 
assessed through a historical survey of Japanese conflict management methods.  Once 
this framework is set, an exploration of Japan’s territorial disputes will demonstrate how 
Japanese leaders have applied its conflict management methods to address its national 
interests.  Though seemingly inconsequential, these disputes have implications for 
regional security, stability, and development.  Deeply rooted identity issues of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty further complicate this situation.   
Whether one has a realist, liberal, Marxian, or utopian world-view, the fact that 
conflict exists, or can exist, is universal.  Consequently, there are many theories 
concerning the topic of conflict management.  Though there is no one definition of 
conflict management, many theories have been produced that attempt to explain conflict 
and ways in which to avoid, prevent, arbitrate, and resolve disputes.  Japanese policy 
makers currently defines conflict prevention in the following manner:3 
 efforts to address economic and social issues which could become 
fundamental causes of future conflict where signs of such conflict have yet to 
emerge;  
 the elimination or alleviation of a political or social structure of confrontation 
which could escalate into conflict (reconciliation and mediation, etc.);  
 peace-making activities directed at ending conflicts which have already 
broken out; and,  
 the maintenance of peace and prevention of conflict recurrence after cease-
fires or peace agreements.  
                                                 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2000. 
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The question arises as to whether this definition is based on a western model or one 
derived from Japan’s historical and cultural tradition.  To assess this query, it is important 
to compare western conflict management and traditional Japanese conflict management.  
This portion of the thesis examines a western approach to conflict management, and uses 
a historical survey, to deduce a Japanese theory of conflict management.  It is from this 
newly developed Japanese “theory” that an exploration on how Japanese decision makers 
can resolve its territorial claims will be conducted. 
A. WESTERN APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Based on a leader’s perception of the international system, a generalization can be 
made to determine a country’s foreign policy outlook and, quite possibly, foreshadow 
possible actions in a given environment.  In his book Asian Security Practice4, Muthiah 
Alagappa presents three worldviews: realism, liberalism, and commercial liberalism.  The 
next couple of paragraphs will explore the relationships between contending worldviews 
and conflict management. 
1. Contending Worldviews 
Traditionally, realists subscribe to several tenets.  They believe that the 
international system is anarchic.  Out of this anarchy comes the nation state.  Hans J. 
Morgenthau characterized this anarchy as a struggle for power by nation states.  The idea 
of state-centric actors completes the second tenet of realism.  This nation state’s quest for 
power is external in nature.  Consequently, “[a government’s] primary obligation is to the 
interests of the national society it represents, not the moral impulses that individual 
elements of that society may experience.”5   This notion of the separation of domestic 
politics and foreign policy demonstrates the third principle of realism.  Ultimately, the 
final tenet posits that all the states within the system are equal sovereigns in the 
international system.  Therefore, they compete with one another to seek power.  
Consequently, the state’s survival and advancement is based on its own military might.  
Survival is equated with self-help, a strong military, and unilateral action between these 
                                                 
4 Alagappa, Muthiah, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 51-62.  [herein cited Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational 
Influences] 
5 Kennan, George F., “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1985/1986, 206. 
4 
competitive states.6  It is a zero-sum game based on material assets—one nation’s gain is 
another nation’s loss.  To maintain the status quo, a weak realist needs alliances and 
balances of power to ward off other nation-states and to provide stability in the system.7 
Ultimately, states are power maximizers who prefer to be self-dependant in security 
issues.8  Additionally, a state acts rationally to maximize its power; thus, it will not 
engage in activities that may ultimately destabilize its power.  Robert Gilpin summarizes 
a realist view of international relations this way, 
…international politics still can be characterized as it was by Thucydides: the interplay of 
impersonal forces and great leaders…  World politics is still characterized by the struggle 
of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a coalition of global anarchy.  
Nuclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant; economic interdependence 
does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of 
common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy.9 
Whereas realists are more pessimistic about international relations, liberals share 
a more optimistic view.  According to Jeffry Frieden and David Lake in their article 
“International Politics and International Economics,” liberalism has three basic tenets.10  
The first is that an individual or non-state actor is the basic unit of measure.  This is a 
stark contrast to the realist state-centric international system.  Consequently, domestic 
agendas, non-governmental organizations, and individual rights can dictate the politics 
within the international system.  The second tenet subscribes to the idea that these 
individuals are rational and seek to maximize profit or some other personal stake.  This 
should note be confused with a zero-sum mentality but rather comparative gains such that 
all parties involved will desire to continue to work together toward a beneficial end.  This 
leads to the final principle, which states that the best way to achieve this maximum value 
                                                 
6 Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), 105-107. 
7 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 123-131. 
8 Ibid., 121. 
9 Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
11. 
10 Frieden, Jeffry A., and David A. Lake, “International Politics and International Economics,” in Goddard, 
C. Rose, John T. Passe-Smith, and John G. Conklin (eds.), International Political Economy: State-Market 
Relations in the Changing Global Order, (Boulder Rienner, 1996), 26-28. 
5 
is through exchange with others.  Ultimately, for liberals to maximize their value, there 
must be harmony in the system.  The method to ensure this harmony is by ensuring that 
exchanges result in a positive sum gain for all participants.  Since disharmony and war 
disrupt efforts for positive gain, cooperation and communication among individuals will 
aid in diffusing conflicts due to the established means of communication and desires to 
continue profitable relations.  The resulting cooperation happens in spite of the anarchic 
international system and eventually leads to a maturing and ordered system.  Liberal 
models within the international system vary from altruistic non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, which maximizes value by aiding others in 
need, to the United Nations, which maximizes its own prestige and stature while 
intervening in a wide array of international roles and functions.  This liberalized system 
puts a lot of credit behind laws and organizations to produce a dependant society that will 
grow in harmony.  When disputes arise, a liberal will turn to existing organizations for 
arbitration and all nation-states will abide by the decisions in the best interests of the 
community.   
The economic offshoot of the liberal theory is the commercial liberal approach.  
Commercial liberals base the maturing process of the international system on economic 
interdependence rather than international organizations, laws, and courts.  “The relatively 
low cost of trade and its increasing benefits, the growing cost of force and it diminishing 
returns, and social learning that will occur… can move international relations in the 
direction of a ‘trading world’ characterized by interdependence based on differentiation 
in functions and reciprocity.”11 Joseph Nye’s theory of neo-functionalism and regionalism 
broadens yet clearly defines how this interdependence occurs.  In his book Peace in 
Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations, Nye lists the seven process 
mechanisms that states go through as they interact with one another - inadvertent 
linkages, rising transactions, coalition forming, socialization, regional formations, 
regional identity, and external spill-over.  Each of these steps spill-over into the next, 
                                                 
11 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, 53. 
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creating a more mature interdependent system.12  Consequently, states will cooperate with 
one another so as not to interrupt the economic prosperity they all share in.   The 
European Union epitomizes Nye’s idea of regional functionalism.  What started out 
originally as a trade and coal partnership between France and Germany in the early 1950s 
developed into the matured economic community in Europe.  It is similar cooperation 
that allows competing states to manage potential conflicts that may arise. 
2. Conflict Management Theory 
Conflict management is a generic term also based on cooperation and is used to 
explain the methods in which actors within the international system deal with change or 
conflict.  The preferred result is to resolve the conflict peacefully, but a country’s 
worldview will set-up the parameters in which the conflict will be evaluated.  For 
example, a realist would assume — given the anarchic and zero-sum nature of 
international politics — that war is the only true method of resolving conflict.  A liberal, 
on the other hand, may advocate an arbiter or mediator to address the issue of contention.  
Still again, a commercial liberal may avoid the conflict all together to ensure a working 
peace is maintained.  Given these contending worldview theories, one can explore how 
international actors may approach conflicts. 
a. Approaches to Conflict 
According to Joseph Nye, “Since recurrent armed conflicts are frequently 
the product of enduring rivalries between pairs of hostile states, addressing and resolving 
animosities and problems in particular relationships is clearly a way to avert violent 
conflicts.”13  The Prussian military theorist and writer, Carl von Clausewitz tells us that 
war is an instrument of a nation’s policy and that its aim is to impose this policy, or will, 
on the other nation.  Clausewitz was obviously a realist and helped shape the traditional 
explanation of why nations go to war.  Unfortunately, this does not explain how or why 
nations should avoid war.  Clausewitz’s theory of war is based on a zero-sum game.  
                                                 
12 Nye, Joseph S., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations, (Boston, MA: Little 
Brown, 1987), 64 - 75. 
13 Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 
Prevention Management, and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
Inc., 1999), 105.  [herein cited: Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution]. 
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Simply put, for Nation A to impose its will on Nation B, Nation A must win and Nation 
B must lose.  However, is this necessarily the case? 
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Nation A Goals 
Figure 1. Five Approaches to Conflict14 
Conflict resolution explores the idea of achieving mutually beneficial 
terms to resolve a dispute through cooperation.  This entails caring about the outcome not 
only from Nation A’s perspective but that of Nation B as well.  This relationship of 
concern is demonstrated in Figure 1.  If Nation A is concerned more about its goals than 
those of Nation B, than you have conflict as Nation A attempts to impose its will on 
Nation B.  When Nation A gives up its goals in favor of Nation B than Nation A is 
yielding because it feels Nation B’s will is greater than Nation A’s will.  However, if 
there is low concern for Nation A’s goals, then Nation A will avoid conflict because the 
costs outweigh the benefits.  The middle segment represents the situation where there is 
equal concern between Nations A and B and that they will compromise in a negotiated 
settlement.  The ultimate goal is for Nations A and B to both achieves their goal, in which 
the conflict has been permanently resolved.  This may be easier said than done.  
However, Robert Axelrod and Anatol Rapoport offer some compelling theories on the 
importance of cooperation in resolving conflicts. 
b. The Role of Cooperation in Resolving Conflicts 
Both realists and liberals concur that nations cooperate with one another to 
realize mutual benefit and advantage even though there is a state of anarchy in the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 6. 
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international system.15  Realists, however, believe this cooperation is mutually beneficial 
in limited situations such as allying against a common neighbor or deciding on 
telecommunications or railroad track gauge.16  Empirical data for cooperation theory 
derives from various sources most notably the work done by Robert Axelrod and his 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.17  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates the power of cooperation.18  Robert 
Axelrod set up a game theory around a seemingly simple scenario.  The following 
analogy was developed for ease of understanding.  A bomber is shot down over enemy 
territory after a successful bombing run.  The pilot and co-pilot are taken prisoner.  They 
are kept in different cells and asked to divulge information about which of the two is the 
one who actually released the bombs—the captors only want to kill the bomber.  If 
Prisoner A defects and blames Prisoner B, then Prisoner A is set free and Prisoner B is 
executed.  If both Prisoner A and B defect and blame each other, then both are tortured 
until the truth is known.  However, if both cooperate, and remain silent or tell the same 
story then the captors would look elsewhere.  Obviously, there is the chance for the 
following situations: lose-lose (both being tortured), win-lose (one is set free and the 
other is killed), and win-win (the captors look elsewhere).  The dilemma created is that 
two self-interested prisoners who defect in hopes of release can be caught in a lose-lose 
situation indefinitely. 
Unfortunately, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can only be used once with human 
subjects.  If used in a series, then there is the possibility that cooperative behavior can 
develop.19  Consequently, Anatol Rapoport set up a computer simulation of the Prisoner’s 
                                                 
15 Fearon, James D., “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1998, 269.  [herein cited: Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and 
International Cooperation”]. 
16 Ibid., 269-270. 
17 While there are a great many works by Robert Axelrod on cooperation, game theory, and decision- 
making, my research on the Prisoner’s Dilemma comes from his book, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
18 Axelrod, Robert M., The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 206-207. 
19 Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 8.  The idea behind the original 
study was to determine the unbiased responses to the circumstances. 
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Dilemma and tried to evaluate the best strategy given the same scenario.  The best 
statistical strategy was found when both parties would cooperate until one tried to get one 
up on the other.  In turn, the “loser” of the previous engagement tried to go up on the 
other.  This interchange became known as tit-for-tat (TFT).  Since the TFT strategy 
resulted in either a loss or a tie in every pairing, over the long run (62 exchanges), the 
TFT strategy compiled the most beneficial statistical outcome overall.20  This was 
accomplished because the TFT strategy never fully committed to an all or nothing 
attitude but rather alternated to match its opponent; consequently limiting and ultimately 
avoiding the potential for the lose-lose outcomes.     
c. Achieving Cooperation  
In both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Tit-for-Tat, it is evident that 
cooperation, and placing importance on the other person’s interests, can prevent the lose-
lose situation.  Third parties to a conflict can intervene and help bridge the conflicting 
parties toward the ultimate goal of cooperation.  Sometimes this is easier said than done.  
To cooperate there must be an understanding of each side’s positions, interests, and 
needs.21  This understanding can come in the forms of negotiation, arbitration, or 
mediation.   
Negotiation occurs when the two parties talk it out themselves and come 
to a compromise or agreement.  Arbitrators (“mediators with muscle”22) tend to use some 
sort of power base from which to operate.  It can be through the enforcement of laws, 
military might, or coercion of some other sort.  On the other hand, mediators tend to 
resolve conflict through “communication and facilitation.”23  These mediators may 
operate within the existing framework, which generally produces results in the forms of 
bargaining or compromises.  The truly successful mediators, however, create new 
frameworks that transform the problem into something that benefits both parties.   
                                                 
20 Rapoport, Anatol, The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1995) 273-274, 558 - 559. 
21 Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 9. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23 Ibid.,  11. 
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The United Nations and its Security Council was created by the United 
States and its Allies after World War II as a method to avoid another world war.  It was to 
be the western led allies’ method of addressing conflict management in the future.  This 
western dominated organization is a model that has survived over half a decade and 
interceded in a multitude of conflicts to ensure the peace and stability of the world as 
defined by its predominantly western permanent Security Council members.  
Consequently, examining its structure and methods of working through conflict will be 
beneficial since the Japanese aspire to join this group. 
3. The United Nations and Conflict Management 
During intense conflict situations, it may take a third person to step between 
opposing parties to manage a dispute.  The United Nations’ charter establishes the UN as 
an open forum in which countries can approach one another equally to discuss their 
grievances.  Through this forum, an exchange of views between the disputants may yield 
a peaceful resolution through settlement.  Conflict management, and its eventual 
resolution, is seen as a wiser and more civilized approach to the age-old dilemma of war.  
The general idea behind conflict management and its effectiveness is based on 
proactiveness and understanding by the parties involved.  Though it may seem novel, 
conflict resolution has been around since at least the Greek times, with the existence of 
the Delian League and its balance of power strategy.  This early Greek organization had 
regulated trade between its members, as well as proposing a system within which to 
provide for conflict resolution that might arise due to trading as well as dealing with 
neighboring but non-aligning states.  In today's maturing international system, nations are 
moving from the traditional balance of power of yore and progressing toward coalitions, 
a system afforded to the international system by the United Nations' charter, which 
recommends methods of conflict resolution.  Article 33, paragraph 1, states: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of the international peace and security, shall, first seek a solution by negoti-
ation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other means of their choice.24 
                                                 
24 United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html, 8 October 01. 
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There are various aspects of conflict management in the UN charter as mentioned 
in Riggs and Plano's book The United Nations: International Organization and World 
Politics.25  Negotiation is timeless in its applicability.  Consequently, it is generally the 
first step that nation-states avail themselves of when involved in a dispute.  Negotiation is 
the traditional form of diplomatic communication between opposing forces.  Good 
communication, whether public or private, goes a long way in airing out grievances and 
misunderstandings, as well as potentially deterring armed conflict.  Most disputes arise 
due to misperceptions of existing facts.  Questions over facts might escalate to a greater 
conflict in some disputes.  UN inquiries dispute questions of fact using an impartial 
commission.  If, through inquiries, the problems are deeper than a misunderstanding or 
otherwise routine matter of fact, a mediator might need to become involved. 
Mediation enlists the active participation of a third party.  This person then makes 
recommendations on possible proposals, or settlements.  Generally both parties agree on 
the mediator and, in turn, openly disclose all pertinent information.  Ultimately, the 
mediator assists the conflicting parties in resolving the conflict rather than imposing a 
settlement upon them.  In cases where the parties just cannot agree on a settlement, then 
an arbitration process may occur.  Arbitration gives both disputants free choice of 
selecting judges.  In return, they agree to show respect for the settlement mandated.  This 
is because there is no obligation for sovereign states to comply with international 
judgements.  The Secretary-General can act as a third party, with the added influence his 
position may bring.   
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is yet another tool available to assist in 
resolving disputes should negotiation, mediation, and arbitration fail. ICJ is a fully 
funded organ of the United Nations.  The primary problem is the ICJ has no real 
jurisdictional enforcement.  Though states are not bound to the jurisdiction of the court, 
court deliberations and findings can factor into a leader’s future decisions.  It is only 
though bilateral and multilateral treaties that a state may be forced to consent to the 
court’s jurisdiction.  Article 6, paragraph 2 has the "optional clause" which gives states 
                                                 
25 Riggs, Robert E., and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 
(Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988) 
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the option of falling under the jurisdiction of the ICJ.  Whether or not there is compliance 
with specific rulings, nations do take notice of the international precedents set.  
Another way in which the United Nations may deal with an issue of conflict is to 
delegate an issue to the region.  The rationale is that only the local regions could fully 
understand and empathize with the situation at hand.  During the Cold War, regional 
actors or organizations would rather work out issues themselves instead of having a 
larger third party imposing themselves within the region with their own agendas.  This 
could potentially open the door for greater instability within the region and not resolve 
the issue at hand.  Since the end of the Cold War, regional diversity has proved too 
complex for larger powers to manage.  Consequently, the UN has been able to allow 
regional actors to take a more active role in their respective regions.   
At the end of World War II, the victorious powers set up the UN to avoid future 
wars.  Article 33, paragraph 1, of the UN charter verbally establishes the international 
desire to use conflict management to address contending issues.  Given Japan’s economic 
power and Tokyo’s ambition to join the permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
Japan may be the bridge between this western-led forum of conflict management and the 
rest of the world.  This will further legitimize the UN as a means of managing conflicts in 
the future.  While this would seem to be a desirable outcome, a survey of Japanese 
conflict management is required to ensure a firm understanding of the Japanese point of 
view.  The next section will access this viewpoint.   
B. SURVEY OF JAPANESE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Research has yielded no concise theory on Japanese conflict management 
concerning Japan, or anywhere else in Northeast Asia.  This can be attributed to the 
geographic isolation of pre-Perry Japan and that Japanese “foreign” policy was more 
“domestically” focused.  Feudal Japan resembled feudal Europe and though a Treaty of 
Westphalia did not create a nation-state system on the island of Japan, similar state 
relationships evolved between the clans.  Therefore, the following section will be a 
survey of historical indicators to assist in developing a working definition of what 
Japanese conflict management has been - from their traditional era to the present.   
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This survey will establish that Japanese ideals of foreign policy are more 
dialectical and avoid the confrontational zero-sum characteristics of decision making in 
the West.  Japan does not have the long history of dealing with issues of ethics and 
foreign policy found in the West;26 however, social order has always been important.  As 
such, internal methods of managing conflict have developed.  Consequently, these 
traditional methods, as well as post-Perry methods, will be evaluated to understand how 
Japanese leaders react to solving disputes.  The following survey of Japanese conflict 
management takes us back to Japan’s traditional era. 
1. Early Japan - Japanese Confucian State (660 BC–1185) 
Though there is archeological and anthropological evidence to support an early 
civilization and contact with Asian neighbors (at least 10,000 BC), Japan claims its 
mythological existence back to 660 BC.  It is not until 57 AD, however, that an emissary 
made his way to the Han Court of China.27  It is from the Chinese that the Japanese 
learned their earliest foundations in government and foreign relations in the ordered form 
of Confucianism.  Japanese scholars learned of Confucius and developed strong 
Confucian ties, which delineated a hierarchy with China in the middle and other 
kingdoms, such as Japan, in the periphery of the expansive influence of China.  China 
maintained suzerainty over its younger neighbors and a tributary system was established.  
An Asian, pre-modern conception of territory was based on cultures and “floating zones” 
and peripheries.28  While no country had truly clear territorial boundaries, the Japanese 
islands ensured a certain amount of autonomy from Chinese influence.  However, one 
could argue that since Chinese emperors had some sort of suzerainty over all Asian 
territories, and allowed other kingdoms to manage territory on the periphery of China, 
                                                 
26 Gabrielson, Jon R., The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An 
Alliance Based on “Shared Values and Interests” (Thesis), June 2000, Naval Postgraduate School, 48.  
[herein cited: Gabrielson, The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: 
An Alliance Based on “Shared Values and Interests”]. 
27 Tsunoda, Ryusaku, Wm. Theodore de Barry, and Donald Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition, (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1958) 3-4.  [herein cited: Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, Sources of 
Japanese Tradition]. 
28 Holsti, Kalevi J., “The Changing Nature of International Institutions: The Case of Territoriality,” Institute 
of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 32, November 2000, 3-
5.    
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any suzerains to Chinese leadership would not encroach upon another’s territory without 
consent from the Chinese court. 
There were great changes occurring around Japan from the mid-sixth century to 
the mid-seventh century.  The Japanese presence in Korea had been removed from the 
peninsula.  Japan’s Korean ally, Paekche, was eventually defeated by the Silla Kingdom, 
which ultimately united the peninsula in 668.  In addition, the Sui (581-618), and later 
T’ang (618 – 907), Dynasties established a large united dominion in China.  The rise of 
strong neighbors seemed to weaken further a fragmented Japan, as clans fought in the 
midst of cultural and economic upheavals.  The Japanese civilization needed 
strengthening, and a sovereign who could intercede.29  
Prince Shōtoku Taishi, a devout Buddhist, pointed toward Confucianism as a 
means to provide stability and refocus Japan.  Prince Shōtoku relied heavily on the 
Confucian ethical and political doctrines to achieve the uniformity and centrality of the 
past Chinese dynasties and kingdoms;30 however, he ensured a Buddhist religious belief 
system that was not dependant on its Chinese originators.  (Whenever there was a conflict 
between the two belief systems, Confucianism was looked to for secular matters, while 
Buddhism maintained spiritual guidance.31)  In 604 AD, Japanese leader Prince Shōtoku 
is said to have developed the Seventeen-Article Constitution.  This provides a basic step 
to understanding Japanese order and conflict management.  It was based on moral 
concepts of right and wrong, good and evil, vice power politics and expediency, even at 
the expense of individual rights and freedoms.  Harmony was key.  The highest 
commitment to society in Japan was to be loyal to the society itself;32 public good was 
placed above private interests.33  This is exemplified in Article I, which states: 
                                                 
29 Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 36-37.  
30 Ibid., 49-50.  Though the Sui Dynasty used the legalist theory of rule, Prince Shōtoku idealized the early-
Confucian models of discipline and control of the pre-Sui dynasties and kingdoms. 
31 Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition,  38. 
32 Christopher, Robert C., The Japanese Mind, (New York, NY: Fawcett Columbine, 1984), 55. 
33 Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 49. 
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Harmony should be valued and quarrels should be avoided.  Everyone has his biases, and 
few men are far-sighted.  Therefore, some disobey their lords and fathers and keep up 
feuds with their neighbors.  But when the superiors are in harmony with each other and 
the inferiors are friendly, then affairs are discussed quietly and the right view of matters 
prevails.34  
This harmony was not enough though.  The “constitution” realized conflicts 
would arise and that they needed to be resolved peacefully.  The last article is dedicated 
to resolving these conflicts.  
Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone.  They should be 
discussed with many people.  Small matters are of less consequence and it is unnecessary 
to consult a number of people.  It is only in the case of important affairs, when there is a 
suspicion that they may miscarry that one should consult with others, so as to arrive at 
the right conclusion.35 
Article XVII states unilateral decisions in “weighty affairs” can cause harm or miscarry.  
Additionally, consensus of action prevents mistakes made in haste and without proper 
thought.   
Though not an actual constitution, these guidelines provided the Japanese people 
with their first sense of identity and nationalism.  This provided a basis from which all 
Japanese people would aspire and relate to others.  These uniquely Japanese ideals 
framed its foreign policy.  This distinction allowed the Japanese to think of themselves as 
separate from the prevailing Chinese suzerainty, even though using and adapting a 
Chinese belief system to call their own.  From the fourth to the eighth century, Japanese 
leaders continued to select and adapt foreign concepts and make them uniquely 
Japanese.36  
                                                 
34 Columbia University, East Asian Curriculum Project, “The Constitution of Prince Shōtoku,” 
Contemporary Japan: A Teaching Workbook, 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/japanworks/teachingaids/japan/japanworkbook/traditional/Shōtoku.htm, 
7 June 2001.  [Emphasis added].  [herein cited: Columbia University, “The Constitution of Prince 
Shōtoku”].  
35 Ibid.  [Emphasis added.]. 
36 Gabrielson, The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance 
Based on “Shared Values and Interests,” 54. 
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The traditional era has defined the Japanese people from its Asian neighbors, as 
the Japanese believed they could trace their origins from the gods.37  This society placed 
the public good ahead of individual interests.  To ensure this community focus, important 
decisions were to be derived from communication and consensus building to ensure there 
were no missteps in Japan’s continued quest for greatness.  Throughout the rest of this 
traditional era, Japanese leaders worked internally to improve its government, arts, 
Buddhist ties and understanding, and culture.  One of these “improvements” to the 
government was the establishment of strong households, or clans (uji), who ran the 
country in the Emperor’s name.  Unfortunately, this would lead to infighting and 
eventually to the establishment of a feudal system of governance. 
2. Feudal Japan - A Decentralized System (1185–1600) 
Courtly politics began to incite competing interests and claims over the throne.  
Military battles ensued and militarized clans centered in Kamakura seized power and 
“assisted” the emperor in running the country.  These military rulers were referred to as 
shoguns.  Law in Japan, as has been demonstrated, aspired to prevent conflict through 
interpersonal harmony.38  Consequently, to ensure their strength in Japanese internal 
politics, the Kamakura Shogunate published the Jōie Shikimoku (code of the Kamakura 
Shogunate) in 1232.  Among other things, it provided a means of settling disputes.  The 
code stated no matter who started a land dispute; both parties were guilty and ran the risk 
of losing their land, life, or both – usually both.39  This basic tenet of territorial disputes 
survived for six centuries.  Of course, this was for internal matters but the idea of social 
order presided over individual gain. 
Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, Buddhism flourished and Zen 
monks became the secular advisors on foreign affairs.40  The monks were considered 
                                                 
37 It was not until the eighth century, that Japan developed a unique creation story (The Record of Ancient 
Matters or Kojiki, [712].) that established a direct lineage of its people and islands from the gods 
(Chronicles of Japan or Nihogi, [720].). 
38 Gabrielson, The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance 
Based on “Shared Values and Interests,” 45.  
39 Varley, H. Paul, “The Age of Military Houses,” in Arthur E. Tiedenmann’s (ed.), An Introduction to 
Japanese Civilization, (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), 66. 
40 Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 261-262. 
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enlightened warriors who were schooled in protecting life and the court rather than 
killing and war.41  Their expansive knowledge of China and Chinese ways allowed them 
to function as mediators in trade negotiations and matters of the court.  The education and 
utility of these Zen monks became the foundation of the aristocratic samurai class in the 
Tokugawa period. 
In 1343, scholar Kitabatake Chikafusa re-enforced Japanese uniqueness within the 
world with his Jinno shōtō-ki (The Records of the Legitimate Succession of the Divine 
Sovereigns).  It is here that Shintoism evolved from an animistic study of kami (spirits) 
and became synonymous with Japan and being Japanese.  This declaration of uniqueness 
did not reject foreign schools of thought (which had provided past foundations of 
Japanese government and belief) but rather showed how they were imperfect in their 
understanding of Shinto (read Japanese) principles.42  
Provincial leaders needed to ensure order within their locality.  Usually they used 
the Shogunate’s edicts as a guide to assist in this task.  At times, however, the provincial 
leaders would supplement the edicts as necessary.  The following quote comes from a 
provincial edict in the mid-fifteenth century: “All quarrels and disputes are strictly 
forbidden.  If this is disobeyed, both sides will be put to death, without inquiry into right 
and wrong.”43  Internal dissent was considered a source of weakness in feudal Japan and 
was stomped out. 
One year later in 1467, the Shogunate lost centralized control of the provincial 
lords and the Onin War began.  Though this particular war lasted only ten years, it kicked 
off a period known as the Warring States Period (sengoku jidai).  During this period, 
there were continual attempts to centralize control over all Japan.  It was not until 1568, 
when Oda Nobunaga began to unify Japan.  After Oda’s death in 1582, his most 
successful general, Hideyoshi, continued Oda Nobunaga’s campaign to unify Japan and 
almost succeeded in 1590. To maintain his centralized control, Hideyoshi issued several 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 263. 
42 Ibid., 274. 
43 Sansom, G. B., Japan: A Short Cultural History, Revised Edition, (New York, NY: Appleton Century 
Crofts, Inc., 1962), 427. 
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edicts, similar to those of his predecessors.  One of these edicts discussed the importance 
of domestic harmony: 
If farmers possess only agricultural implements and devote themselves exclusively to 
cultivating the fields, they and their descendants will prosper.  This compassionate 
concern for the well-being of the farms is the reason for the issuance of this edict, and 
such a concern is the foundation for the peace and security of the country and the joy and 
happiness of all the people.44  
Unfortunately, Hideyoshi’s compassion for domestic peace did not transfer 
toward its foreign policy.  No sooner did Hideyoshi unite most of Japan than he turned 
his military forces against China, through an unyielding Korea.  Hideyoshi died before 
Japan was forced to withdraw in 1598, after a fierce Chinese defense.  His successor 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, was the most powerful regional military lord, daimyo, and ascended to 
the rank to Shogun in 1603 unifying all of Japan and marking the beginning of a 250 year 
Tokugawa Peace.   
The feudal period as a whole demonstrated conflict management skills in the form 
of forced compliance through a strong centralized power.  This seemed to work initially 
nationally, but the Shogunate soon lost control and faced great despair as regional lords 
competed with one another to claim the title of Shogun.  Even with the competing 
struggles for power, the trend of Japanese uniqueness reasserted itself in the form of 
Shintoism.  This “national” religion created an identity that reinforced the idea of 
domestic harmony in the midst of political strife.  This harmony rose to satisfy the 
domestic politics even though the Hideyoshi regime initiated hostilities against its 
neighbors.  Tokugawa Ieyasu recognized the benefits and faults of the last four centuries 
and was able to reestablish a new peace and method of managing conflict.  
3. Tokugawa Japan – Authoritarian Peace (1600–1868) 
Within the first decade of his rule, Tokugawa issued the “Laws Governing 
Military Households” in 1615.  It was a series of edicts concerning behavior and conduct 
of the provincial military elite.  Most of the laws kept the daimyo and their families 
dependent either physically, economically, domestically, or spiritually on the emperor 
                                                 
44 Lu, David, Japan: A Documentary History, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).  [herein cited: Lu, Japan: A 
Documentary History]. 
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and the Shogun.  Of particular note in this survey of conflict management is the first 
article: 
Both [literature and arms] must be pursued concurrently.  Archery and horsemanship are 
essential skills for military men.  It is said that war is a curse.  However, it is resorted to 
only when it is inevitable.  In time of peace, do not forget the possibility of disturbances.  
Train yourself and be prepared.45 
The fact that war is a curse and should be avoided seems to foreshadow future 
edicts Japanese policy makers would have place on the Japanese and regulating the 
government.  In an effort to avoid conflict internally and externally, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate issued a series of laws, against foreigners, which closed Japan off from the 
rest of the world.46  Edo was able to control the amount and type of trade of items traded 
to ensure sources of power (i.e.: firearms) did not challenge the existing political 
structure.  This isolationist tendency was altered slightly in the 1640s to allow for trade in 
remote ports of the island so as not to influence and corrupt the existing structure 
established.  This self-imposed isolation (sakoku) and edict to military households were 
not enough however to ensure tight control.  Tokugawa turned to the samurai who lost 
their masters because of fighting and land consolidation. 
During the feudal period, a large group of unemployed warriors and aristocracy 
were available for hire to protect weaker lords from meeting the same fate as their 
previous masters.  These early ronin allowed weaker lords to apply the lessons of the 
Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu.  During Warring States period (405 BC – 233 BC) in 
China’s history, Sun Tzu expressed the dire nature of armed conflict and gave details on 
how to avoid conflict at all costs.  Armed conflicts generally meant that a loss on the 
battlefield, meant a loss of sovereignty and survivability, which was more important than 
territory –very similar to what the Japanese lords were facing in during Japan’s 
feudalistic period.  This furthers the idea that territory was not worth the costs of an 
armed conflict and resolution by other means ensured survivability of the clan and its 
holdings.  Sun Tzu suggested ways to collect intelligence, use spies, posturing, and 
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subterfuge to maintain the “peace.”  In effect, the best way to win a war was not to fight 
one; and the best way not to fight one is to convince your enemy you are not any easy 
target; hence the mass hiring of ronin.  Tokugawa met the ronin problem by hiring the 
ronin for non-military governmental positions and giving stipends similar to those 
received by the other samurai of their status.47   
The Tokugawa period turned to Confucianism with the Japanese twist of 
Shintoism to achieve social peace and order.  This merging, Bushido, took the order and 
discipline of Confucianism, with Japanese feudal traditions, and places them in service of 
the Emperor.48  Tokugawa capitalized on the previous success of developing a social 
contract of harmony and coexistence while co-opting potential threats with money and 
governmental positions.  This pragmatic mix of tradition and compromise ensured 
domestic tranquility during this period. 
4. Summary of Pre-Modern Japanese Conflict Management 
The traditional era of Japan began in some obscurity.  Its socio-political roots 
seemed to have derived from Chinese Confucianism.  However, while Korea seemed to 
take Confucianism lock, stock, and barrel, Japanese elites were quite choosy when it 
came to Confucianism to establish the earliest governmental guidelines.  With an infusion 
of Buddhist principles, and Shinto creation myth, Japanese scholars were well on their 
way to creating Japan as something similar to, yet different from, its Asian neighbors.  
This uniqueness created a society where individualness was set aside to create and 
maintain a peaceful and harmonious society.  This society still realized the importance of 
individual contributions to the extent that “weighty” decisions must be made in a group.  
This was to ensure that all sides and theories were listened to before a rush to decision.  It 
is without consensus that poor decisions can be made and harmony disrupted.  
During the Kamakura Shogunate, unfortunately, there was anarchy and no peace.  
In the beginning of this era, leaders created a Japanese identity and nationalistic sense for 
their people even before Japan was really a nation.  Not only were the Japanese people 
different from their Asian neighbors, but also those neighbors fell short in the Shinto 
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principles that the Japanese had been following all along.  The warriors were at the top of 
the social ladder and were the provincial leaders.  The Warring States period 
demonstrated a different form of conflict management that utilized strong localized 
control to prevent internal unrest and posturing to prevent other daimyo from attacking.  
This posturing came in many forms; most notably the hiring of masterless warriors, 
ronin, to help ward off pending attacks.  Eventually, the strongest clan won out and 
united the nation. 
The Tokugawa era turned back the hands of time and used the principles that were 
successful during the early traditional rule period – society before self, consensus rule (as 
set forth by the Shogun), and harmony.  To assist in this quest, and to prevent the seeds of 
revolution, the Tokugawa Shoguns prevented foreign influence by closing up the ports 
and limiting contact with foreigners.  Tokugawa Japan also captivated the warriors with a 
new martial spirit of Bushido, which allowed them to operate freely yet, still be loyal to 
the Emperor.  This indentured relationship, tied with strict guidelines on conduct, and 
administrative positions, allowed the Tokugawa Shogunate to effectively remove the 
internal military threat to secure internal peace while ensuring a ready force should an 
external power attempt to enter Japan.  
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III. WESTERN INFLUENCE ON JAPANESE CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN’S TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES  
Before 1854, when Commodore Perry’s Black Ship cast its shadow in Edo 
(Tokyo) Bay, Tokugawa Japan was a self-imposed isolationist nation.  Its internal make-
up was feudal in nature with a divine Emperor as its sovereign and a militaristic 
Shogunate as its ruler.  For 250 years, the Japanese people were at peace and content with 
its development and status in the world.  
A. THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN’S NATIONAL POWER AND THE 
BEGINNING OF ITS TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
The appearance of the Perry delegation to establish coaling rights, fair treatment 
of lost sailors, and terms of friendship and trade with Japan was an affront to Japanese 
sensibilities.  The subsequent unequal treaties (treaty port system, most favored nation, 
and extraterritoriality) symbolized a forfeiture of  “national honor” due to the concessions 
that were made to the West.49  The Japanese government realized it was no match 
militarily for the West so it set out on a journey of discovery and knowledge to learn, and 
re-negotiate, using western diplomacy.  The West stated that these treaties would remain 
in place until Japanese officials made major legal and constitutional reforms.  As a 
consequence, the Iwakura mission took place from 1871 to 1873 with the intent to learn 
from western culture and develop Japan into a “prosperous country and a strong army.”  
In the mid-1870s, Japanese policy makers adopted a more assertive foreign policy that 
embodied a crash course in western colonial programs.50  The idea of territory and trade 
equated to national power in western terms.  While Japanese elites did not want Japan to 
be a western power, they did want Japan to be seen as a powerful nation to its new 
western “friends” and imposers of unequal treaties.  The following section will 
demonstrate how Japanese decision makers secured areas of interest and influence to the 
north, west, and south.  Ultimately, even after the Sino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese, and 
two world wars, these territories are still in dispute.   
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1. Japan and the Northern Frontier  
At dispute are four islands off the tip of Japan’s northern island, Hokkaido.  
Japan’s claim to the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles (Japan/Russia) is through the 
Russo-Japanese Friendship treaties of 1855 and 1875.  Russia claims the territories in 
dispute through World War II treaties and agreements.  Currently, Russia maintains 
sovereignty over the islands in dispute. 
Japan and Russia have a long and contentious history in the Kurile Islands.  
Cossack trappers in search of seal and sea otter hides came from the north in the late 
eighteenth century only to be turned away by the Tokugawa regime.  In 1855, the Treaty 
of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation (a.k.a. the Shimoda Treaty) established 
Japanese sovereignty over the four southern Kurile Islands (Habomai, Shikotan, 
Kunashiri, and Etorofu), while the remaining islands north of Etorofu belonged to Russia.  
The Japanese government furthers their argument by stating that Commodore Putyatin, 
the Russian representative for the Shimoda Treaty, and Czar Nicholas I recognized 
Russia’s southern most boundary as Uruppu, the island north of Etorofu.51  Since the 
island of Sakhalin (Karafuto in Japanese) was still in dispute, an 1875 Treaty for the 
Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands was signed between Russia and Japan.  The 
treaty stipulated that Japan ceded sovereign interests in Sakhalin Islands to Russia.  In 
exchange, Russia would yield the remaining 18 Kurile Islands, north of Etorofu and south 
of the Kamchatka Peninsula, to Japan.  After the Russo-Japanese War, the 1905 
Portsmouth Peace Treaty granted Japan control over southern Sakhalin, as well as 
recognizing Japan’s interest in the Korean Peninsula.  Japanese officials maintained 
administrative control of these territories until the end of World War II. 
2. Japan and the Sea of Japan/East Sea 
While the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 finalized Japan’s territorial interests in 
the northern frontier and Korea, it signified the beginning of a territorial dispute in the 
Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea).  Tokdo (Korea), Takeshima (Japan)52, or 
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24 
Liancourt Rocks (United Kingdom) is a group of two islets and 33 rock formations 
located 49 nm from South Korea and 86 nm from Japan.  Seoul claims sovereignty over 
Tokdo after conquest of the territory in 512.  Japanese leaders, on the other hand, claim 
Takeshima based on international law as spelled out in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  The Foreign Ministry of Japan states, “Takeshima Island 
is an integral part of Japanese territory…  There is no question about this.”53  Tokyo is 
asking an international court to settle the dispute while the ROK vehemently opposes this 
measure.  The government of South Korea currently possesses the territory and the 
formerly uninhabited islands have a migrated population that is supplied via helicopter by 
the ROK.   
Historically, Tokdo was originally its own domain (Usan-guk), and it was 
incorporated into the Silla Kingdom in 512 as recorded in the Samguk-sagi (History of 
the Three Kingdoms) of 1145.54  After the conquest, it was referred to as Usando and 
changed to Tokdo in 1883.55  North Korean leaders support the South Korean 
government’s claim.  Various Japanese maps and publications support Korea’s 
possession of the territory.  The Onshu Shicho Goki (What Was Seen or Heard About 
Onshu) of 1667, and Sankoku Setsujo Chizu (A Territorial Map of Three Nations) of 
1785 depict Usando (Tokdo) as a part of the Korea.56 In the mid-seventeenth century, it 
appears Japanese leaders claimed the islands but appeared to allow Korea to take 
sovereignty during the Tokugawa era.57  This forfeiture could additionally fortify a 
Korean claim based on prescription or the notion of unfettered possession over time. 
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In  1876, taking a page from the Unites States’ gunboat diplomacy, Japanese 
officials sent its own black ship to Korea and the Treaty of Kanghwa opened Korea to 
Japanese traders, diplomats, and soon the West.  Japanese interests in Korea and China 
competed with those interests of the Russian czar led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.  
As a result of the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, the 
Japanese government re-established its influence over Korea and its territories.  All of 
Korea, to include Tokdo, was made a Japanese protectorate and Japanese officials 
administered the island’s fishing resources as its own until the end of World War II.   
3. Japan and its Southern Boundary 
To the southwest is the final territorial dispute Japan has with its neighbors, the 
People’s Republic of China and Republic of China.  At dispute are five uninhabited 
islands and three rocky outcroppings.  They are situated 190 mi. west of Okinawa and 
200 mi. east of Taiwan covering an area of 7-sq. km. on the edge of the Asian continental 
shelf on the Chinese side of the Okinawan Trough.  Although Japanese Maritime Self 
Defense Forces actively patrol the area, Chinese leaders claim historical precedent since 
naming them Diaoyutai (Fishing Islands) in the fifteenth century.  The Japanese refer to 
the territories as Senkaku-jima (Pointed House Islands) and claim sovereignty because of 
discovering previously unclaimed territory.  (This variation in names is a source of 
confusion for outsiders and can potentially create further complications should the 
dispute be resolved when correcting maps and the like.)  Currently, Japan maintains 
sovereignty and patrols the waters of the islands but there are no inhabitants. 
Early Meiji leaders’ quest to solidify Japan’s southern boarder led to a 1871 
friendship treaty with the China recognizing Japanese interests in the region of the 
Ryukyus.  However, in 1874, Japanese leaders resorted to “saber rattling” to secure more 
than just interests in the region.58  After a legalistic misstep by Chinese decision makers 
in an international court, Japanese officials were able to establish sovereignty over the 
Ryukyus.  Chinese and Japanese diplomats can both agree on these islands, however the 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai are not as easily reconciled.  Chinese decision makers admit they 
accepted Japanese control of the Diaoyutai after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
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Japanese leaders states Chinese perceptions are mistaken and that the Senkakus were not 
ceded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  Japanese officials claim discovery of the islands in 
1885, and after extensive surveys, claimed the islands as a sovereign Japanese territory in 
January 1895.59 Consequently, the Senkaku were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the 
Pescadores Islands, which were ceded by the Ch’ing Court in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
Japanese diplomats add that all territories ceded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Taiwan 
and Pescadores) were returned in the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty of 1952.60   
4. Summary of Japanese National Power and Conflict Management 
Throughout this section on the Japanese government’s quest to secure Japanese 
territorial boarders and spheres of interest, scholars, leaders, and decision makers needed 
to resolve differences between its pre-western ideals of peace, harmony, and cooperation 
and western colonialism to “save face” from the recent humiliation of the unequal 
treaties.  The late Tokugawa and early Meiji regimes emulated the colonial West as it 
attempted to match the carving up of Asia in hopes of being militarily, and economically 
equal to the great western powers of the age.  This led to wars with both the governments 
of China and Russia over Japanese influence in Korea and Manchuria.  In the 1930s, 
there was a split of nationalistic ideals as the government and military had different 
approaches to solve economic resource problems in Japan.  An ultra-nationalistic 
movement shaped Japanese methods of dealing with the rest of Asia, specifically the 
influence of the western colonial powers.  This ultra-nationalism is seen in Japanese 
decision makers’ “go it alone” mentality in 1933 as it dropped out of the League of 
Nations and a military coup d’etat in 1936.  A year after the coup, the Kokutai no hongi 
(Fundamentals of Our National Polity), was published and warped the traditional beliefs 
of harmony, inner peace, and Bushido into a “revolutionary nationalism” that captured 
the public.61  Out of self-interest, Japanese elites used concept of uniqueness and 
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superiority as a means to free the rest of Asia of its western bonds so that Asia could once 
again be for Asians (under Japanese rule) during World War II.  This became known as 
the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in which Japanese leaders sought to free 
Asia of western colonialism, which threatened Japanese hegemonism and influence over 
the area.  Ultimately, Japanese leaders lost their desire for peaceful harmony in a quest to 
expand outward and to continue to maintain its sense of Japanese destiny - the formation 
of a Greater Asian Co-prosperity sphere to liberate Asia for Asians.  
B. COLD WAR TERRITORIAL DISCOURSE IN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL TERMS  
The establishment of the Cold War divided the world into three camps—the free 
world, the communist world, and the third world.  The first two camps balanced one 
another through conflicts in under-developed and developing nations.  Japanese territorial 
issues took a back seat, for the most part, in order for the U.S. to ensure an ideological 
victory over communism. 
1. Soviet-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue 
After surrendering to the Allied powers on 15 August 1945, all of Japan’s 
territories were occupied by Allied forces, as stipulated in the 26 July 1945 Potsdam 
Declaration.  The U.S. military forces occupied the main four main islands of Japan 
(Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku), as well as the Ryukyu Islands, to include 
Okinawa and Senkaku, and the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.  The Chinese 
Nationalists took control of Formosa (Taiwan) and Manchuria; and, the military forces of 
the Soviet Union occupied Sakhalin and all the Kuriles, to include the four islands 
acknowledged in the Shimoda Treaty of 1855, as well as the northern half of the Korean 
Peninsula.  On 2 February 1946, the USSR incorporated the occupied territories into their 
territory through a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and expelled the 
indigenous Japanese while relocating Russians into the area.62 
The Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943 established the framework and 
ground rules of the San Francisco Peace Treaty from which the three great allies (U.S., 
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U.K., and China) would occupy Japan and its territories at the war’s end.63 Of particular 
note is the policy of no territorial gain of the signatories.  Consequently, there was an 
agreement that the return of territory would reflect a pre-Sino-Japanese War (1895) Asian 
landscape to include the return of Manchuria, Formosa, the Pescadores, and “all those 
territories which [Japan] has taken by violence and greed.”64  
The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty was not signed by the Soviet Union.  The 
main sticking point was the definition of the Kurile Islands.  The common line of thought 
was that the Kuriles that Japanese leadership gave up in the treaty did not refer to the four 
that the 1855 Russo-Japanese Friendship Treaty clearly gave Japan.  The truth is that 
Japanese officials understood that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (the two larger 
northern islands) were a part of the Kuriles to be given back as presented to the Diet on 
19 October 1951, by the Foreign Ministry's Treaties Bureau head.65  Unfortunately, the 
Soviet Union did not want to compromise and the treaty remained unsigned. 
 To end the war with one another officially, the Soviet Union and Japan tried to 
negotiate a separate peace treaty from June 1955 to October 1956.  This time, the 1956 
San Francisco Peace Treaty addressed the two-island compromise, which was in line with 
what the Japanese expected in 1951.66  This compromise was offered by the Soviet 
Union, but American officials suggested that if Japanese decision makers yielded in this 
situation, the U.S. would consider keeping the Ryukyu Islands.67 Changes within 
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Japanese politics forced an all or none approach from Tokyo.68  Japanese diplomats 
refused to sign the treaty, but a joint Japan-Soviet Declaration was signed that ended the 
state of war and opened official diplomatic relations.  The Declaration continues to 
stipulate that the USSR (and now Russia) will return Shikotan and Habomai to Japanese 
control upon the successful signing of a treaty.  Efforts by Japanese diplomats to address 
the other two islands with the Soviets after 1956 met with a strict Soviet boilerplate 
response of refusing to negotiate sovereign Soviet territory.  This could be attributed to 
the competing territorial issues the Soviet Union had with China and the former Soviet 
republics; hence the Northern Territories dilemma.  If Soviet leaders made concessions 
with Japanese officials on the Northern Territories, then other nations may attempt to do 
the same.  Additionally, there were, and are, some factions in Japan that would have the 
government claim all the Kuriles and half of Sakhalin in accordance with treaties signed 
in 1855 and 1875.69 Consequently, the Soviet Union, and now Russia, fears a concession 
on four islands may open the door to future Japanese concessions on the remaining 
territory. 
The Cold War relationship between the Soviet and Japanese leaders was 
characterized as seikei fukabun (“the inseparability of politics from economics”).70   In the 
1960s, Japanese policy makers tried to shift nationalistic tendencies away from the U.S. 
occupation in the Ryukyu Islands toward the Northern Territories and the USSR.  The 
subsequent national outcry allowed Japanese diplomats to offer developmental aid to 
Moscow in return for a discourse on the Northern Territories.  This did bring Moscow to 
the table, but Moscow refused to discuss the issue for fear of opening up the Soviet 
frontier to dispute.71  In 1977, fishing disputes involving Northern Territory and territorial 
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water issues continued to keep the dispute in the forefront of the Japanese national 
debate.72  Japanese officials continued to link the development of closer economic ties to 
progress in resolving the territorial problem.73  Unfortunately, Soviet-Japanese relations 
were hobbled by Japanese adherence to the principle of the inseparability of political and 
economic issues that characterized Soviet-Japanese Cold War bilateral relations.  (It must 
be noted, however, that this was the exception to the rule for Japanese policy makers, 
who embraced the sei kei bunri policy of “separation of economics and politics.”)  
Though clinging to a rigid large-scale aid package until the Kurile dispute was settled, 
Japanese diplomats had offered humanitarian aid after Gorbachev agreed to speak about 
the Northern Territories in bilateral talks.74   
2. ROK-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue 
Based on post-World War II documents, Tokdo was not to remain Japanese 
territory and US occupation forces ensured Japanese anglers could no longer fish within 
12 nm of Tokdo.75  The Japanese government has made, and continues to make, regular 
protestations of the Peace Line outlined in Syngman Rhee’s 1952 Presidential 
Declaration on Sovereignty of the Adjacent Seas.76  Even after the 1965 normalization 
between the governments of South Korea and Japan, nationalism on both sides left the 
Tokdo/Takeshima issue unresolved.77  This can be attributed to the need by both countries 
to shelve this contentious issue to reap the benefits of diplomatic and economic relations.  
In 1981, there was an official ROK protest after Japanese patrol boats docked at the 
islands.  In 1983, Japanese officials were equally upset after ROK fishermen docked at 
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the islands.78  The Republic of Korea continues to bolster its position by inhabiting the 
islands.  Seoul is considering the placement of improved pier facilities, electricity plants, 
water generators, and land reclamation projects for inhabitants.  
Neither Tokyo nor Seoul discusses the disputed territories when relations are 
cordial.79  Unfortunately, Japanese and South Korean nationalistic groups tend to keep 
ties strained.  This is especially true when one country is in need of the other.  Such was 
the case during the Cold War.  Since the governments of Japan and South Korea were 
both on the “same side” in an U.S. versus USSR bipolar world, Japanese policy makers 
were forced to subordinate their views in the larger context of American foreign policy 
goals.   
In an attempt to ensure an enhanced anti-Soviet security posture in Northeast 
Asia, President Reagan met with President Chun Doo Hwan and Prime Minister Suzuki 
Zenkō in the spring of 1981.  The result was the implication of a greater Japanese role in 
the region.  This expanded upon the legacy of the Nixon-Sato Summit, which noted 
Japan’s stake in Northeast Asian stability.  This expanded role of Japan’s greater defense 
came in the form of loans to assist the South Korean government in improving its 
security measures.  Though a $6 billion loan was originally agreed upon by Presidents 
Reagan and Chun, the Japanese said it would provide only $1 billion in loans over five 
years.80  Suzuki mentioned Takeshima and Korea’s desires not to discuss the territorial 
issue as reasons for not working with Korea on the loan for the original amount.  The rest 
of the Cold War was marked by concerted efforts of both governments to increase both 
diplomatic and economic ties despite their continued dispute fueled by strong 
nationalistic tendencies. 
3. Sino-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue 
The issue of sovereignty was never big until Japan, the People’s Republic of 
China, and the Republic of China began competing for economic resources.  The area 
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surrounding the islands is rich in resources.  In 1968, an Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East reported oil deposits in the area between Taiwan and Japan in which the 
Senkaku Islands fall.81  While there is still unsubstantiated speculation concerning 
hydrocarbon deposits, there are fisheries and plants that have medicinal value.  
Japanese officials further the defense of their claim by pointing to American 
control of the islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands.  When U.S. officials gave back 
Okinawa to Japan, it also gave back the Senkaku Islands.  However, when Japanese 
diplomats turned to U.S. leaders for support in September 1970, the State Department 
stated that it would take a neutral stance and encouraged the involved parties to settle the 
dispute among themselves.82  During Congressional debates on the reversion of the 
Ryukyu Islands, it was stated, “transferring its [U.S.] rights of administration to Japan 
does not specifically constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty nor can it affect the 
underlying claims of any of the disputants.”83  This coincided with President Nixon’s 
announcement of plans to visit China.   
With American policy shifting toward Chinese rapprochement, Japanese decision 
makers preferred a multilateral approach to exploiting the resources.  Japanese officials 
attempted joint exploration with Chinese diplomats.  The diplomats, however, would not 
discuss the issue until after its sovereignty was assured.  The governments of China and 
Japan consequently agreed to sidestep the Senkaku issue in the 1970s to improve and 
normalize their relations.84  Japanese officials were able to convince the governments of 
Taiwan and South Korea to pursue joint oil exploration while the PRC stood in the 
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wings.85  This joint exploration quickly stopped after the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974.86 
After a May 1978 demonstration of over 100 Chinese fishing boats sailing around 
the islands, Deng Xiaoping suggested in a press conference that the issue would be 
handled better by the next generation.87  Taipei and Beijing are joined on this issue.  Since 
that time, however, there have been several confrontations including: oil concessions 
made by Taiwan (Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force turned the survey ships back); 
planting of an ROC flag (Japanese officials arrested and deported the transgressors); 
placing a Japanese lighthouse on an island (there were anti-Japanese movements in Hong 
Kong and China alike); and the 1997 attempted removal of said lighthouse which resulted 
in a sunken Hong Kong vessel as it attempted to cross the 12 mile territorial boundary.88  
The Japanese claim the ship was scuttled, while the Chinese argue that one of the 60 
Japanese patrol boats rammed the Hong Kong vessel. 
While groups on both sides try to inflame the issue, the three capitals involved, 
Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo seem to downplay the incidents and continue favorable 
diplomatic and trade policies.  However, even though these governments wish to “shelve” 
the issue for a much later date, nationalistic populaces attempt to embarrass the ruling 
parties and factions into some sort of action.89 The Japanese ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) further complicated the situation 
and supported the Chinese sovereignty principle because these islands lay on the Asian 
continental shelf of which Japan is not a part.  Japan’s Foreign Minister had stated, “Is 
this an issue we really need to discuss with China and Taiwan?”90 The Japanese Foreign 
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Ministry issued the following, which characterizes the true feelings of Japanese leaders 
on the dispute,  
…the government of Japan has made public that the Islands are an integral part of Japan.  
However, it does not necessarily mean that the Japanese side wants to have the bilateral 
relationship jeopardized by this matter.  On the contrary, although the government of 
China has a different attitude, we would like to strengthen our bilateral relationship, and 
we would hope that this [would] be the case in the future.91 
Surprisingly, Sino-Japanese relations, though seemingly on opposite sides of the 
Cold War fence, actually got better in spite of the Cold War environment.  Chinese 
rapprochement, in July 1972, brought promises of dropping the Senkaku territorial 
issue.92  While the government of Japan still possesses the territories, it was in no real 
hurry to confront Chinese leadership on the issue considering that Japanese businesses 
were interested in investing in the untapped economic markets of the People’s Republic 
of China.  There was no need to quibble over a few rocks that the U.S. government just 
reverted to Japanese control, in a time of such economic potential.  In August 1973, 
during the 10th Party Congress, Chou En-lai sided with Japanese diplomats against the 
USSR on the Northern Territories issue; however, this public support did not assist the 
Japanese government in its relations with the USSR.  As noted in a July 1976 Diet 
speech, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa stated Beijing’s support constituted 
interference in internal matters.93   
It is interesting to note, however, that the Chinese benefited from the territorial 
row Japanese officials had with the USSR.  Refusing to comply with G-7 initiatives to 
prop up the failing Soviet government, in July 1989, at the Paris G-7 Summit, Japanese 
policy makers called for a relaxing of economic sanctions against China after the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in June.94  Less than a year later, in the spring of 1990, 
Japanese and American diplomats agreed to endorse Russian aid in exchange for Chinese 
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aid.95  This aid at the expense of the Soviet Union and Russia will be explained in detail 
later in the thesis. 
It is here that the Japanese government is preparing itself for a new role in the 
international community, separate from that of the Unites States.  The end of the Cold 
War brought Japanese leaders to the realization that “narrow national interests required 
adjustment to an emerging world order.”96  Hence, the use of multinational developmental 
banks (MDBs) and similar non-governmental organizations (NGOs) became the 
instruments needed to resolve policy issues. 
4. Summary of Cold War Japanese Conflict Management 
Being very self-conscious of the atrocities committed prior to 1945 in the name of 
Japanese nationalism and prosperity, Japanese policy makers developed a foreign policy 
known as Comprehensive Security.  This was a three-tiered policy of arms control, 
improved cooperation, and coordination with the leading powers of the world, and 
improving Japanese internal military structure and technology.  Though very 
straightforward from a western sense, this “comprehensive” security is quite nuanced and 
reflects ideals similar to earlier traditional definitions of “security” in terms of 
survivability of what it is to be Japanese.  This nationalistic trend of assisting other Asian 
nations was reflected in generous official developmental assistance (ODA) Japanese 
policy makers allocate to the region.  Japanese leaders still seek to lead Asia into a better 
position in the world but through interdependence rather than military might.  Though 
having a modern facade, this comprehensive security is similar to the Greater Asian Co-
prosperity Sphere of the early twentieth century.  In this venture, however, Japanese 
policy makers ensured that the military would not be the only option for meeting its 
objectives. Japanese foreign policy is comprised of not only military minds, but those of 
economics, cultural, trade, and other non-military areas to ensure weighty decisions are 
made after all avenues have been addressed and considered. 
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C. POST-COLD WAR TERRITORIAL DISCOURSE IN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL TERMS 
With the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government found itself pressured 
into accepting a larger financial role in the world and established itself in the international 
arena.  In so doing, Japanese leaders were able to separate its interests from the U.S. 
government in multinational forums like the G-7.97  Therefore, Japanese officials were 
forced to exercise some of the soft power it established during the Cold War.  This 
economic power-base was valuable in the bipolar conflict of the Cold War; Japanese 
leaders, similar to a victor in a “hot” war, explored the spoils of victory.  This triumph 
was much to the chagrin of Russian leaders, and to a lesser extent the governments of 
China and South Korea.  It will be demonstrated that while the Japanese government did 
not have the military muscle to drastically impact on its neighbors concerning the 
territorial disputes, Japanese policy makers had something much stronger – freedom to 
exercise its own foreign policy goals.  This freedom was separate of those of the 
American foreign policy goals and literally came at the expense of its territorial 
competitors.  Figure 2 graphically demonstrates the relationship of these disputed 
territories with Japan’s neighbors.  
1. Recent Russo-Japanese Territorial Relations 
Since the 1956 joint declaration, there have been warm and cold overtures by 
Moscow toward Tokyo on resolving the dispute.  In general, there appeared to be a delay 
tactic employed by the Russians.  There were complimentary and conflicting outside 
pressure (gaiatsu) concerning aid to Russia.98  For Japanese officials, these included 
domestic issues, relations with western allies (specifically the U.S., but also its G-7 
partners), fears of losing investments dollars from neighboring developing nations, and 
the desire to aid the emerging Central Asian Republics (CARs).99  Japanese policy 
makers, realizing its economic influence, began to seek a niche from which to gain an  
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advantage for future Northern Territories discussions.100  The Japanese Foreign Ministry 
clearly delineated its foreign policy goals with regard to the Northern Territories with the 
following statement: “Although Japan’s attitude has become more flexible, neither the 
Japanese government nor the LDP has abandoned the substance of their basic demand, 
which remains the return of the four islands.”101  
In early 1992, the Japanese government was again pressed to give more aid to 
Russia.  Foreign Minister Watanabe raised the possibility of providing aid if Japan would 
have sovereignty over all four islands, but allow Russia to administratively control the 
two northern islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.102  Yeltsin failed to respond.  
Consequently, Japanese diplomats used the G-7 to multilateralize its bilateral 
disagreements with Russia over the Northern Territories.103  Prime Minister Miyazawa 
Kiichi stated, “The territorial dispute should be the common concern of the entire Group 
of Seven industrialized nations.”104 Ultimately, however, Japan found itself alone on the 
Northern Territories issue and scheduled to hold the G-7 meeting in Tokyo later that year.   
In April 1993, with all eyes on Japan (and with much coaxing from American 
diplomats), the Japanese government gave $1.83 billion dollars (half of what the U.S. 
said Japan would give to Russia) as a part of a $43 billion aid package.105 Japanese 
leaders was able to “save face” in this reversal of policy by (1) controlling the flow of 
money through “closely coordinated consultation;”106  (2) allowing the G-7 to be the 
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leader to ensure this control; and (3) requiring that the aid be used to assist the Russian 
people in self-help programs that were “pragmatic, visible, and tangible.”107 
Knowing Russia seemed to be generous in its discussion of the disputed Kuriles 
while looking for Japanese aid, Tokyo was able to parlay the Tokyo Summit into a 
cornerstone of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations.  The Tokyo Declaration was signed 
during the visit of President Boris Yeltsin of Russia to Japan in October 1993.  Prime 
Minister Hashimoto presented to President Yeltsin a proposal toward a resolution of the 
territorial issue.  Both leaders agreed that the peace treaty should contain a solution to the 
issue of the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles, and incorporate the principles 
governing Russo-Japanese friendship and cooperation, as they move into the twenty-first 
century (the Kawana Agreement).  In the economic sector, leaders agreed to consider 
working together to establish a Russo-Japanese investment company to promote 
investment in Russia, and agreed to continue to steadily implement and expand the 
Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan.108 
Unwillingness to give Russians aid goes beyond the Northern Territories, 
however, as Japanese nationalism guides anti-Russian sentiment.  An insulting and cruel 
history continually reminds the Japanese of its past dealings with the USSR – including 
its belated entry into World War II, Japanese POWs, fishery negotiations, competing 
territory claims, downing of Korean Air 007, airspace violations, dumping nuclear waste 
into the Sea of Japan, and intelligence activities in Japan.109   
After the collapse of the USSR, the Japanese government slightly increased its aid 
to Russia, but still only multilaterally.  As long as the Northern Territories issue was 
unresolved, the aid Japanese policy makers granted would remain small, humanitarian, 
semiofficial, and of a multilateral nature.110  Additionally, mistrust was evident as 
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Japanese leaders were weary of giving aid to Russia through the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) due to a “limitless need of financial aid”; 
however, the Northern Territories dispute did not make the situation any easier.111  In the 
end, multinational development bank (MDB) policies won out over bilateral political 
relations.112  MDB policies allowed Russia to get around these bilateral obstacles. 
Japan’s economic strength was being undermined by MDBs, so Japan decision 
makers adopted a new policy of cooperation.  This cooperative spirit was followed up by 
a new Russia policy outlined by then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in July 
1997.  The Prime Minister appeared to be aiming not to seek the middle ground between 
the Japanese and Russian positions but rather to encourage Russian leaders to decide in 
favor of the government of Japan’s position, offering cooperation in exchange for reform 
efforts.  In the process, this would create a consensus that returning the islands to 
Japanese control would benefit both countries.113  This idea of joint gain over individual 
loss (in the form of forgone investment, aid, trade, and development), as well as poor 
diplomatic relations, was felt by all parties concerned.  Such sentiment has led to 
confidence building measures regarding the Northern Territories.  These include travel to 
the territories without visas, unrestricted trade across the border and mutually beneficial 
trade relations that hinder Russian black-markets of Japanese fish.  
As a result of such cooperation, a framework agreement was signed in regard to 
the operation of Japanese fishing vessels in the waters around the four islands in the 
Northern Territories.114  During a presentation of a paper on Russo-Japanese relations, in 
February 2001, Dr. Tatsuo Arima closely associated poor political and economic ties and 
cooperation with Russia due to the inability of the governments to resolve the Northern 
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Territories dispute.115  Dr. Arima concludes, “If the leaders of Japan and Russia can 
resolve the difficulty lying between us and normalize our bilateral relationship on the 
basis of a peace treaty, the ties between the two peoples will become dramatically 
stronger.”116 
Relations between the two have culminated in the 25 March 2001 signing of the 
Irkutsk Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian 
Federation on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty.117  
It encapsulates all the other meetings as a means of working toward an end of the 
Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles dispute.  The redeeming quality of this document, 
from a Japanese standpoint, is the naming of all four islands being contested and the 
assurance to resolve the matter quickly.  Unfortunately, similar words were used by 
Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1991 Japan-Soviet Communiqué.  Nevertheless, after the cooling 
Yeltsin period, and chilly Putin start, this most recent statement has made the leaders in 
Japan feel warmer toward its chilly neighbor to the north.  Former Japanese Prime 
Minister Yoshiro Mori hailed the signing of the Irkutsk Declaration and said, "USSR 
secretaries did not necessarily acknowledge the 1956 Joint Declaration between Japan 
and the Soviet Union.  It is a big step forward that Japan and Russia confirmed [the joint 
declaration] in a written form.  [The Irkutsk Declaration] could be a great starting point 
for a peace treaty between the two countries."118  
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2. Recent ROK-Japanese Territorial Relations 
Unfortunately, for the governments of Japan and South Korea, historical and 
political conflicts continually hinder economic cooperation.119  Textbooks and other 
issues continually remind the nationalists on both side of the sea to keep the territorial 
issue close to the national consciousness.  Consequently, nationalism, on both sides, fuels 
this territorial debate.120  Unfortunately, Koreans seem to perceive their own government 
as too timid so as not to affect existing economic and diplomatic relations with the 
Japanese government.121  One thing is for certain, Korean political parties and factions 
can all unite on the Tokto issue.  Ultimately, decisions are not made by the public and 
Korean policy makers have had to make some concessions on the Tokto issue for 
economic growth.  One of these concessions includes an ocean development plan called 
the "Ocean and Fishery Vision for the 21st Century.”122  A Japanese Foreign Ministry’s 
statement on the 1997 fisheries agreement sums up both country's desires concerning the 
dispute, “We would like to make positive efforts to conclude a new fisheries agreement 
as soon as possible in the context of our efforts to strengthen the overall relationship 
between the two countries.”  However, added, “… the new bilateral agreement between 
the two countries must be in keeping with the objectives of [UNCLOS].”123  Japanese 
officials has consistently held the position that, in light of the historical facts, as well as 
the rules and principles of international law, Takeshima is an integral part of Japan, and 
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will take a course of continued and persistent dialogue with the ROK on this issue.124  
However, in recent Trilateral Coordination Organization Group talks, neither side has 
brought up the subject, but rather focused on what could be done about the North Korean 
situation. 
This does not sit well with Korean nationalists.  Seoul views subtle infringements 
by the Japanese as a means of solidifying its claim over Tokdo through expansion.  These 
infringements include Japanese citizens claiming residency on Takeshima in census 
records, defense force exercises near the islands, and joint fishery arrangements.125  
However, after a Korean citizen claimed a fisheries agreement “trespassed” against 
Korean fishermen’s rights of sovereignty, Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that a 1999 
Korea-Japan Fishery Agreement126 does not relate to the territorial dispute of Tokdo.127  
This court ruling, however, will not remove the nationalistic rigor on either side of the 
debate.  
3. Recent Sino-Japanese Territorial Relations 
During the Cold War, the Chinese benefited from the rift between the Soviets and 
Japanese.  Despite the Senkaku dispute, Japanese policy makers still provided economic 
assistance and advised the international community against isolating China.128  This came 
in the form of generous aid and the Japanese use of multinational development banks 
(MDBs) to benefit the Chinese regime.  These Sino-Japanese relations were evident in 
1978 when the governments of the PRC and Japan agreed to shelve the territorial dispute 
issue “until the next century” during a signing of the peace and friendship treaty.  
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However, these good times seemed to take a turn for the worse.  In 1992, Chinese policy 
makers issued its territorial law proclamation that claimed the Senkaku Islands and 
islands in the South China Sea as reclaimed Chinese territory taken during its century of 
humiliation.129  This proclamation notwithstanding, Japanese officials still pushed for 
developmental aid to China rather than Russia.130  This can be attributed to several 
factors.  The first is a close Asian bond to China.  While the Japanese has gone to great 
lengths to differentiate Japan from China, there is still the knowledge that Japan and 
China have a shared history.  Additionally, the government of Japan possesses the 
Senkaku, and is in control, whereas Russia controls the Northern Territories, which 
Japanese leaders are trying to recapture. 
These ties, however, do come under stress when domestic politics influence 
Japanese foreign policy, especially in the later half of the 1990s.  After ratifying 
UNCLOS, the Japanese government came under pressure to establish formally a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around all of Japanese territory.  This has created 
tension between the governments of China, Japan, and South Korea.  In response, 
Chinese officials sent oil-drilling vessels near the Senkaku Islands to reassert its claims to 
the territory.131  Additionally, as Beijing conducted some nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996, 
Tokyo was prompted to suspend a portion of its official developmental assistance (ODA) 
to China.  From the Chinese perspective, Japanese ODA was seen as war reparations 
under a different name.132  Chinese missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan 
Strait in March 1996 further riled Tokyo, and generated increasing sympathy for the 
democratic - and openly pro-Japanese - government of President Lee Teng-hui.  133  
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Tokyo, however, is secure in the knowledge that the U.S.-Japan Treaty makes provisions 
for the defense of those islands.134  In 1996, the reemergence of the dispute over the 
lighthouse of the conflicted islands further rocked bilateral ties.  Tensions rose in 1996 
over Senkaku sovereignty issues in Hong Kong and Taiwan.  However, Tokyo and 
Beijing down played the situation to prevent a rift in their relations.  “…  [Japanese] 
policy makers still appear overwhelmingly to believe that supporting Beijing’s reform 
process is crucial if the country [China] is to become a responsible power.”135 
Along these lines, in August 1996, a Sino-Japanese fishing agreement concerning 
the Senkaku/Diaoyutai seemed to have quelled the troubled waters.136 The following 
statement was made by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, “We sincerely hope that both the 
people of Japan and the People's Republic of China deal with the Senkaku Islands issues 
calmly, so that it will not affect the friendly relationship between Japan and China, which 
the government of Japan regards as highly important.”137   Japanese leaders would rather 
favor joint development and sovereignty, than have modernized Chinese naval forces to 
threaten the region further.138 
In summary, the Chinese national sensitivity to sovereignty issues tends to drive 
Chinese politics and compel Chinese officials to take an active stance on the territorial 
claims.139  As such, Chinese decision makers dispatched drilling vessels to the waters 
surrounding Senkaku, and sided with the South Korean position on the Takeshima 
dispute.  The intent was to demonstrate to the Japanese the effects their territorial claims 
will have on Sino-Japanese relations.  The Chinese government seems content with the 
existing relationship rather than push potentially damaging issues to a head.  Similarly, 
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Japanese leaders do not want the territorial dispute to hinder Sino-Japanese relations; 
however, they will not cede its interests in the Senkaku Islands either.  The Japanese 
Diplomatic Bluebook 1999 offers the following summary of its position on the 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute:   
…with regard to the issue of recognition of past history,  [China and Japan] affirmed in 
the Japan-China Joint Declaration that squarely facing the past and correctly 
understanding history were the important foundations for further developing relations 
between Japan and China, and that it would be important to firmly maintain this basic 
stance.  With regard to the Senkaku Islands issue, Japan will continue to deal with this 
matter in line with Japan's basic position that the Senkaku Islands are an integral part of 
Japanese territory and that Japan has effective control over them.  The central tasks 
facing the peoples of both Japan and China will be to steadily address these various 
causes of concern between Japan and China, further deepening mutual understanding 
through the expansion of exchange at various levels, the younger generation included, 
also working together on the various challenges facing the international community.140 
 
4. Summary of Post-Cold War Japanese Conflict Management 
Japanese decision makers has long believed that conflict prevention should be 
addressed through a comprehensive approach and has taken every opportunity to appeal 
to the international community on these grounds.  Such an approach entails developing an 
overall grasp of the various causes behind the outbreak of a conflict (keeping in mind 
efforts from pre-conflict through post-conflict stages), as well as including political, 
security, economic, social, and development areas.  The need for such an approach 
having been confirmed at the ad-hoc G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on conflict 
prevention held in Berlin in December 1999, the international community is gradually 
coming to recognize the importance of a comprehensive approach.  The Japanese 
government for its part will continue to promote this comprehensive approach in settling 
its territorial disputes with its neighbors.  This leads into the next issues of relevance 
concerning Japanese conflict management – the impact of this method of conflict 
management in the government’s foreign policy.  
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IV. THE IMPACT OF JAPAN’S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
STYLE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY 
In 1947, the Japanese Diet signed the United States written Japanese Constitution.  
It has become known as the “peace constitution” because it reflects Japanese desire for 
peace and integration into the international system and renunciation of war as means for 
achieving its national interests.  Consequently, Japanese decision makers have sought 
other than military means of achieving its national interests as reflected previously in this 
thesis.  Given Japanese inclinations toward a conflict management theory, a series of 
expectations can be devised concerning Japanese foreign policy.  As has been seen in the 
territorial disputes, Japanese foreign policy has tended toward bilateral economic 
relationships rather than complex multilateral inter-relationships, thus favoring simple 
frameworks from which to address international issues.141   
During the Cold War, the government of Japan’s policies were primarily to enrich 
its economic influence while marching in-step with United States policy interests.  This 
began to change in the post-Cold War era and Japanese policy makers have been able to 
step out of the foreign policy shadow of the United States.  Though still counting on U.S. 
military protection and external security, Japanese decision makers have been able to 
exercise its own foreign policy interests.  Strengthening the existing U.S.-Japanese 
security framework has allowed Japanese leaders to feel secure in exploring multilateral 
regimes such as economic alliances and even peacekeeping operations.  To address this 
topic clearly, there will be an examination of the existing security dilemma, followed by 
an exploration of Japanese foreign policy in relation to the United States, the region, and 
the world.     
A. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY  
Over an eight year formative period in Japan’s post World War II (1946-1954) 
history, Yoshida Shigeru, post war Japan’s second and fifth Prime Minister and at times 
concurrent Foreign Minister, concentrated on economic recovery while avoiding security 
related international affairs.  This unofficial foreign policy position has been called the 
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Yoshida Doctrine and maintained a neo-mercantilist hold on Japanese foreign policy until 
the mid-1980s.  Though Yoshida denied any “national economy” views, in Kenneth 
Pyle’s book, The Japanese Question, he describes what he believes to be the three tenets 
on which the Yoshida Doctrine was based.  142  First was the Japanese focus on economic 
rehabilitation and the United States was necessary in accomplishing this goal.  Japanese 
policy makers’ strategy of economics first, while relying on a United States security 
guarantee, allowed Japanese leaders to avoid the domestic turmoil and controversy that 
an active foreign policy would have required and was able to focus on economic 
growth.143  The second tenet entailed that the Japanese government should minimize its 
military force to mobilize its citizens for economic reconstruction.  This had the 
additional benefit of allaying its neighbors’ fears as well as minimizing internal struggle 
over rearmament.  Finally, to ensure its own physical security, Japanese officials would 
allow the U.S. Department of Defense to have military bases on its soil.  These last two 
relieved Japanese decision makers of the traditional security dilemma other nations face.  
The idea of arming for defense without scaring your neighbors into an arms race is 
always a concern in this region. American policy makers ensured Japanese security while 
not inciting massive military build-ups within the region. 
Soon after Yoshida left office, in 1956, the Japanese people had achieved the long 
cherished hope of UN membership.  Additionally, the Japanese government had been 
selected to participate as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.  
Consequently, the Diplomatic Bluebook of 1957 set forth the first three official principles 
of Japanese foreign policy: diplomacy centered on the United Nations, membership in the 
Asian community, and maintenance of cooperation with the free world.144  Not 
surprisingly, these principles reinforced earlier notions of peace, harmony, and stability 
as seen before the Meiji Restoration.  Finally, Japanese diplomats were able to establish 
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an international policy to which it was naturally accustomed and was not structured 
according to western precepts.  These three ideals are what continue to shape the 
government of Japan’s foreign policy even today although the structure of the world 
order has dramatically changed.    
In the 1970s, the new Sino-U.S. détente, an emerging oil crisis, and the possible 
withdrawal of American strategic interest from the Pacific (a concern caused by the 
American reversion of Okinawa and loss in Vietnam) forced Japanese leaders to 
reevaluate its reliance upon the United States for its security needs and interests.  Up until 
this time, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took a back seat to the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).  By the mid-1970s, Japanese policy 
makers began to take a more “omni-directional foreign policy” (zenhōi gaikō).145  This 
comprehensive security (sōgō anzen) policy of cordial relations, economic aid, and 
political discourse, was used to satisfy emerging international interests not being met 
through the existing U.S.-Japanese arrangement.   
Still though, this over-lapping of domestic and international affairs was more 
passive than pacifist in nature.146  It has been referred to both domestically and 
internationally as “an extremely defensive defense” (senshu bōei).147  Michael Blaker 
describes this behavior as “coping” or “carefully assessing the international situation, 
methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really 
serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a 
consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the minimum adjustments 
needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing situation with the 
fewest risks.”148  This cautious attitude has been changing to be a bit more forward-
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looking as is evident in the Japanese Defense Agency’s 1996 National Defense Program 
Outline (NDPO). 
The 1996 NDPO dictated that the government of Japan should possess the 
minimum level of basic defense capability as an independent nation so as not to create an 
unstable factor in the region.  Specifically, Japanese decision makers should make its 
defense capability more efficient and compact.  This entailed a reduction in the number 
of Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel by about 10% to 20% (the number varies 
depending on each unit's equipment and personnel).  However, the outline emphasized 
the importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements more than the 1976 NDPO and it 
specified several measures for improving the relationship.  Additionally, it stated that 
while the principal mission of the SDF continued to be the defense of Japan, the SDF 
would also have to be prepared for various situations, such as large-scale disasters, and to 
play an appropriate role in the government's efforts to establish a more stable security 
environment. 
Japanese foreign policy has been moving from “just coping” to being more 
proactive.  The Clinton administration made Japanese officials further evaluate its 
relationship with the United States.  As will be seen in the next section, the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Agreement was revised such that the Japanese government was forced to take a 
more active role in its own defense and in maintaining stability within the region.  While 
this call for a more militarized Japan met resistance by both Japanese and the region, the 
election of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on 24 April 2001 has demonstrated that the 
Japanese people may be willing to consider a larger role for the Japanese Self-Defense 
Force (JSDF).  This role has been accelerated given the international war on terrorism 
following the terrorist action on 11 September 2001. 
Before the war on terrorism, however, the Japanese Defense Agency issued its 
Defense White Paper in July 2001.  In the first part, it stated that the military 
modernization of the PLA exceeds the forces necessary for defense and is a threat to 
stability in the region.149  It argued against the relevant articles in the "Peace 
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Constitution," and stated that since Japan is a country with independent sovereignty, it 
ought to have the right of self-defense.  It not only proposed that the government of Japan 
had the right to its own military forces, but also requested to expand weapons systems 
and strengthen the capability of dispatching military forces.  To enable the JSDF to react 
quickly in emergent situations, it said that Japanese leaders should improve the JSDF’s 
modernization of equipment as well as carry out a revision of relevant regulations that 
restrict the JSDF's action.   
Another feature of the white paper is that it emphasized the importance of 
continuing cooperation with the United States, and carrying out joint research on the 
missile defense system, because Japan is facing a possible security threat.  The American 
military and defense policies have been a “lynch-pin” for Japanese foreign, economic, 
and political relations and development.  Consequently, an appraisal of the U.S.-Japanese 
bilateral relationship is warranted. 
B. EVOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP: THE U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY 
AGREEMENT 
The post-World War II arrangement between United States government and the 
government of Japan has been characterized as a symbiotic relationship of “materiel for 
manpower.”150   This relationship began after the occupation under the watchful eye of 
Yoshida, who was advancing his own plans for Japanese internationalization.  In 1960, a 
security treaty was completed that supported Japanese officials playing an active role on 
the world stage as an economics-oriented nation.  The United States government went so 
far as to give Japan the opportunity to be a full member in the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Additionally, Japanese leaders were able to 
work with such international economic organizations as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Prime Minister 
Ikeda identified Japan as one of the "three pillars" of the free world, with the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan responsible for maintaining an open and free economic order that 
radiated like a fan from the United States and this new treaty was similar in character to a 
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maritime alliance.151  This demonstrated Japanese perception of its importance in the 
existing international system. 
In the 1970s, the Japanese government needed only a limited military capability 
within the international cooperative framework of the U.S.-Japan guidelines.  
International acceptance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance grew during this period.  
Chinese leaders took a more flexible attitude towards the U.S.-Japan security alliance in 
light of its own anti-Soviet and anti-hegemony stance.  Additionally, the Mao 
government agreed with Nixon and Kissinger that the U.S.-Japan alliance helped keep the 
"cork in the bottle" in preventing Japan from becoming an independent military power.152  
Through host nation support (HNS) and use of land, Japanese leaders had secured 
an American presence on the islands.  This has numerous implications for both the 
governments of Japan and the United States.  The security agreement ensured the United 
States’ commitment to the area.  This commitment provided a certain amount of stability 
to the region and could ward off potential disputes (i.e.: territorial disputes and the 
Korean Peninsula).  While this may satisfy joint U.S.-Japanese interests, their bilateral 
relationship also allowed the Japanese government to assume a certain amount of its own 
international standing and prestige.153  The U.S.-Japanese alliance had given the 
government of Japan international creditability without fear of Japanese independence of 
action.154 
This has not been lost on some American policy makers who have seen Japanese 
officials as advancing their own policies without any of the risks.  Japanese diplomats 
have depended on the United States government for defense matters and have used it as 
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an opportunity to meet its international interests through “economic rationalism.”155  
When Americans have called for reciprocity or burden sharing, Japanese leaders would 
talk about constitutional constraints, pacifism, the fear of its Asian neighbors, and the 
“specter of revived militarism.”156  Due to such debate and after a series of regional 
threats (i.e.: the North Korean nuclear program and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis), 
the U.S.-Japan security alliance was re-visited.  The New Defense Guidelines were 
established in 1997 and they redefined the roles of both the governments of the United 
States and Japan.  Consequently, the United States would provide structure to the Asia-
Pacific region and the world abroad through its military might.  In return, U.S. leaders 
would give prior notification, if not consultation, to Japanese officials concerning U.S. 
troops in Japan for non-Japanese defense in providing security and stability to the region.  
The government of Japan is assuming some burden sharing in the form of greater HNS 
and logistical support.  There is the additional agreement that there will be joint defense 
related technology development (i.e.: missile defense).  Given this focus on regional 
stability, it would be relevant to look at how the Japanese government addresses its 
regional concerns. 
C. JAPAN AND REGIONALISM  
On 15 August 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Prime 
Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement of apology that was approved by the 
Cabinet.  He expressed “feelings of deep remorse” due to the “tremendous damage and 
suffering [Japan caused] to the people of many countries” “through its colonial rule and 
aggression” during the Great Pacific War.157  Since the end of the Cold War, the 
government of Japan has become dialogue partners with its Asian neighbors which 
allows the Japanese to explain their policies and atone for its past.158  It is through this 
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dialogue that Japanese diplomats may be able to bridge the gap between east and west 
through economic policies and greater leadership roles for the region in the world. 
Japan has traditionally emphasized economic cooperation [in the region] from the 
perspective that economic development is most important for regional stability.  For 
instance, top priority has been placed on the Asian region in Japan’s programs.  Such 
efforts have contributed greatly to the peace and prosperity of the region, and Japan will 
continue the endeavor.  In addition to these efforts, what must be strengthened are the 
political and diplomatic endeavors on direct and indirect contributions toward solutions 
of regional conflicts and confrontations, such as the Cambodian problem or the Korean 
Peninsula problem.  It is essential to play a positive role in multilateral cooperation and 
consultations in the region as symbolized in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and to support each country’s efforts to democratize, open up the economy and 
transform it into a market economy.  Amid the evolving world order, the international 
contribution expected of Japan is not confined merely to the economic arena but also 
increasingly includes the political dimensions as well.  Japan, with the correct recognition 
of history, will have to make positive contributions appropriate for a peace-loving 
nation.159  
The Japanese government’s newly adopted post-Cold War foreign policy was 
stated in the 1991 Diplomatic Bluebook.  It clearly reflects that there are connections 
between Japanese security and stability in the region and economics.160  Though espoused 
ten years ago, this idea has manifested itself into a possible new security relationship in 
2001.  A new security partnership has been proposed by the Australians that would seek 
to stabilize the region by having Japan take a more active part in the stability of the Asia-
Pacific region.  The government of Japan said that it was willing to consider a new 
process of security dialogue involving Australia, Japan, the U.S., and possibly the 
ROK.161  The idea of this organization is to supplement the existing organizations in the 
region while further developing the Japanese role, in conjunction with Australia, in the 
security areas of peace and stability.  The following section will discuss political and 
economic linkages as a means by which the Japanese government is seeking stability in 
the Asia-Pacific through the Korean Energy Development Organization.  
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1. Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
Northeast Asia is Japan’s own backyard and of most immediate concern.  The 
government of Japan has allowed itself to be a part of various organizations to help 
enhance security in this region.  While no one organization or framework is more 
important than the other is, Japanese support of the Korean Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) is probably the most relevant.  Since its inception in 1994, KEDO 
has laid out a framework in which North Korea freezes its nuclear program in exchange 
for two light water reactors (LWR) and a supply of heavy oil until the LWRs completion.  
The U.S. government picked up the bill for the oil and a portion of the LWR project, 
while South Korea (70%), Japan (over 20%) and the European Union (approximately 
2%) pick-up the remaining $4.6-5.1 billion dollar price tag for the LWR.  162 Since 
General Electric pulled its bid for the LWR, Japanese businesses will be building the 
reactors as well.   
For a marginal amount of aid, Japanese diplomats have had informal 
coordination, and unofficial bilateral relations with the government of North Korea, as 
well as those of China and South Korea.163  By offering the North Korean government an 
incentive to negotiate with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and U.S., KEDO 
established a functioning model of multilateral cooperation in security matters in 
Northeast Asia.  Such security dialogue increases confidence building and transparency 
between nations.164 
Whether or not the framework results in a permanent peace concerning nuclear 
arms control, the dialogues and confidence building measures between the Northeast 
Asian participants (Japan, and the two Koreas), and regional actors (China, Russia, and 
the U.S.) may bring even greater stability to the region.  Considering the lack of a 
Northeast Asian security regime, the 1994 Agreed Framework may be unknowingly 
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sowing the seeds of a mechanism that will assist in providing transparency, stability, and 
top level governmental dialogue in the region.  
2. Southeast Asia 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) founding principle in 1967 
was to achieve peace and security by increasing trust, confidence, and stability of its 
members to enhance common economic and developmental interests.165  Like Japan, 
ASEAN prefers regional stability to fighting over individual issues.166  Japanese policy 
makers see ASEAN as representing a strong Asian identity.  In his article “Asians: 
Drawing Together to Confront Their Own Problems,” Patrick Smith referred to Asians as, 
“prefer[ring] their own solutions, in whatever form, for the many political, economic, and 
social challenges confronting them.”167   
As compared with other regions in the world, this cooperation among Asian 
countries is still developing and a more effective relationship is required to meet the 
demands of regional development and the challenges brought by globalization.  
Consequently, Japanese officials were instrumental in the formation in the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF).  Set up in 1993, the ARF is the only region-wide, governmental-
level, multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.  Current membership 
includes the ten ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) plus Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the PRC, South Korea, 
Russia, and the United States.  Some consider the ARF too weak due to the slow nature 
of its decision-making processes and inability to reach consensus.  Consequently, the 
Conference on Security Cooperation Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP) can compliment the 
ARF in increasing cooperative dialogue, transparency, and building a framework of 
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cooperation.168  Japanese decision makers hope that regional organizations like these can 
assist in mitigating the realist security issues in the region. 
3. Economic Diplomacy 
Japanese foreign policy objectives of peace and stability in the region can be seen 
in its economic assistance to and investment in other Asian nations through Japanese 
official developmental assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI).  The 
government of Japan seeks to lead Asia into a better position in the world but through 
interdependence rather than military might.  Table 1 demonstrates that Asian countries 
receive the bulk of Japanese ODA.  
 
Table 1. Major Recipient Countries of Japan’s Bilateral ODA 
The criteria for such aid were established in April 1991, by Prime Minister Kaifu.  
He asked the bureaucratic ministries of Japan to consider the following during decision-
making related to giving aid and investment:169 
 Is the recipient nation developing and manufacturing weapons of mass 
destruction? 
 Is it promoting democracy? 
 Is it making efforts to move toward a market-oriented economy? 
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 What is its human rights record? 
Additionally, in an attempt to promote disarmament and limit the sale of weapons, 
Japanese officials have also tried to use ODA incentives to curtail “continuous and 
excessive military spending,” poor human rights, or exporting arms or weapons 
technology.170  However, while such criteria are established as an ideal that Japanese 
institutions strive to follow, the Japanese government has looked at countries in a case-
by-case fashion.  For example, China has managed to escape these criteria or at least have 
more weight placed on some criteria while ignoring others.  Consequently, Japanese 
diplomats have engaged Chinese leaders to improve peace, stability, and harmony in the 
region even though isolated by others in the international community (i.e.: the United 
States) for human rights violations.  
 
Table 2. Japanese FDI by Regions and Selected Countries 
Japanese leaders argue that interdependence mitigates security threats and that 
exchanges of technology, trade, foreign direct investment, and aid contribute to a 
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harmonious region.  Table 2 demonstrates Japanese investment throughout the world to 
enhance the mutual interdependence needed to secure its importance and stability in the 
international system.  Japanese trade with the world is represented in Appendix A. 
While Japanese trade in Asia has been historically larger than in other regions in 
the world, some, like Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, would rather 
have the Japanese trade primarily with Asian countries.  It is hoped that such Asian 
specific trade would further enhance the stability of the region.  Japanese leaders, 
however, believe that integration should be constructive and open rather than constricted 
to a possible East Asian trading bloc.171  Former Finance Minister Hata Tsutomu stated in 
the 1992 Annual Meeting of the IMF Board of Governors meeting that, “Regional 
cooperation and integration should not devolve into regional blocs or resurgent 
protectionism.  It is vital to the development of the world economy that while each region 
uses its own strengths to achieve development, it keeps its markets open to others, 
thereby promoting a multilateral free trade system.”172 Along these lines, Japanese policy 
makers are against the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) voting as a bloc in APEC as 
this would alienate Europe or the United States. 
D. JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
The government of Japan was honored to be selected to a rotating non-permanent 
position of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1956.  For the last decade, 
Japanese leaders have been hoping to get a permanent seat on the Security Council (SC).  
This would be a method in which the government of Japan could not only share the 
economic stage with the European Union and the United States but also a political role as 
well in “managing international peace and stability.”173  More importantly, however, is 
that the Japanese Constitution, like the UN Charter, is based on peaceful cooperation.  
Previous sections in this thesis have demonstrated that this is not just a political document 
but also a part of the Japanese character.  There is no better way for Japanese policy 
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makers to further their ideals of cooperation, peace, and stability and share its 
experiences in doing so than through participation in a worldwide organization like the 
United Nations.  This experience would give the Japanese an objective view of conflict 
due to its peace constitution.174  It would also allow Japanese officials to fill the roles and 
responsibilities described above more effectively.175 
The UN Charter prohibits the use of force, except for the common interests of the 
international community, and suggests the use of peaceful means to settle disputes.176  
Since these ideals coincide with Japan’s peace constitution, Japanese leaders should be 
able to exercise its “expertise” in the area to settle disputes and resolve crises before they 
result in war.  Unfortunately, up until the 1990s, with the exception of official 
development assistance (ODA), Japanese leaders have used its constitution to side step 
any collective action directed by the UN.  However, the Japanese government has been 
exercising and loosening the restrictions of its constitution to meet its desire of achieving 
a permanent UNSC seat.  Japanese leaders have sent Japanese Self Defense Forces 
(JSDF) to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Cambodia (1992) and most recently to East 
Timor (2001).  Additionally, Japanese nationals have held key positions as chairman of 
the UN High Commission on Refugees, and as head of the UN Transnational Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC).177  
However, all is not well for Japanese officials and their desires for a permanent 
seat on the UNSC.  It is somewhat hypocritical for a nation whose constitution balks at 
the notion of collective security to be permanently involved in an arm of the UN that 
determines whether or not collective action needs to be taken in accordance with Chapter 
7 of the UN Charter.  It was not until the 1990s that JSDF were even involved in UN 
PKO missions.  In 1992, however, the Japanese Diet signed the Peacekeeping Operations 
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(PKO) law that allowed for no more than 2,000 troops to be assigned to PKO.  These 
troops could only carry small arms (pistols) for self-defense and can only provide 
logistical/refugee support provided there is a cease-fire in place.178  Since the signing of 
this law, Japanese SDF have served in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and 
Mozambique, as well as conducting minesweeping in the Gulf, and the UN 
Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights.179  Most recently, 400 Ground Self 
Defense Force (GSDF) troops are scheduled to go to East Timor in the spring of 2002 to 
take part in peacekeeping operations that will consist of road construction.180  
Government reports indicate that 1,200 GSDF (the approximate number of troops sent to 
Cambodia in 1992-1993) may be sent to East Timor. 
To be a world leader, the government of Japan will need to have an active and 
constructive security policy, which will promote multinational cooperation on security 
issues.181 Japan’s territorial disputes have demonstrated its ability to incorporate foreign 
policy aims through traditional methods tempered with western influence.  Japanese 
desire for peaceful resolution of its territorial disputes is representative of the way in 
which Japan’s foreign policy has emerged after the Cold War.  The government of Japan 
has mitigated protracted disputes of territory to advance peace and stability.   
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Japanese leaders have developed a western-style perspective on conflict 
management that incorporates traditional Japanese concepts of order and cooperation.  
Examples of Japanese contributions to the activities of regional organizations include 
assistance in strengthening the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Trilateral Coordination and 
Organizational Group, the Asian Development Bank, and the Korean Energy 
Development Organization.    
In addition to giving monetary aid for development, Japanese policy makers have 
developed suggestions for conflict prevention and crisis management in its Diplomatic 
Bluebook 2000.  The following is a synopsis of those suggestions:182 
 actors should fill roles according to their comparative advantage; 
 solid coordination must be used to prevent overlap or possibly negating 
previous efforts by another actor; and, 
 a forum should exist that allows for dynamism and initiative. 
Additionally, Japanese decision makers want the UN and NGOs to take the 
lead in conflict prevention and crisis management by creating international initiatives and 
policies.  The Japanese believe that this process of communication should be routine in 
nature among all actors involved, and not reactive to crises.  This will increase 
cooperation, coordination and ultimately, prevent conflict.   
Japanese officials also have other methods of stemming conflict.  Contrary to 
Japanese Cold War practices, the Japanese government now states: “Governments are 
requested to increase flexibility in their management of ODA and to share information, 
with a view to assisting and encouraging NGOs engaged in conflict prevention.”183  It also 
recommends education as way of conflict prevention in non-conflicting countries as a 
means of helping to resolve conflicts abroad.  Additionally, NGOs, as autonomous and 
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independent agencies, can assist in this training, and possibly assist in reconciling 
differences between conflicting parties.  
A. JAPANESE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
A Japanese conflict management style has emerged throughout this thesis.  Most 
notable is the concept of communal harmony at the expense of the individual.  This 
higher sense of community, however, was only expressed when dealing with other 
Japanese within the confines of a centralized governing force, either provincially, or 
countrywide.  This came, of course, in the form of what some may consider oppressive 
regimes with little to no individualism.  The Japanese, however, made up for this by 
ensuring that a certain amount of consensus was needed in making important decisions.  
It is here that the individual (the elites in charge) could express their concerns and issues 
before a decision is made.  This communication and harmony broke down during two 
periods that were evaluated, the Warring States Period, and the first half of the twentieth 
century.  It must be noted, however, that even during these times, Japanese focus has 
been on the survivability of the national ideals of Shintoism.  These ideals encompassed 
the traditional notion of state before self, domestic peace above conflict, and Japanese 
uniqueness always.  
Japanese leaders have attempted to Japanize western concepts of conflict 
management.  Surprisingly enough, westernized concepts of peace and cooperation 
dovetail nicely with pre-modern concepts of Japanese conflict management skills.  
Consequently, the Japanese can effectively operate in such dialogues.  Unfortunately, 
Japanese officials have not always been effective in applying its conflict management 
skills when realist, power politics influence the world stage.  During the Cold War, when 
Japan diplomats were in similar situations, Tokyo would need to adapt its foreign policy 
to that of the larger powers.  However, since the end of the Cold War, Japanese leaders 
has been able to stand a bit more independently and create a cooperative system which is 
unique, from a western perspective, while still satisfying all the parties’ interests.  It is 
this flexibility and responsiveness that has allowed the government of Japan to compete 
with two major world powers, and hotly contested rivals in its territorial disputes.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES  
From an official Japanese stance, the Northern Territories are undergoing positive 
talks, South Korean officials should allow the Takeshima debate to go before an 
international court, and the Senkaku Islands are not under dispute.  Some may argue that 
this is no way to manage a conflict.  However, after analyzing the major facets of the 
territorial disputes, it is not difficult to conclude that from a political and economic 
standpoint, the issue of these territorial disputes has been resolved.  Although there is 
debate as to which country possesses the territories, the conflicts over these territories 
have provided the arena to allow for diplomatic discourse, understanding, and trade.  This 
can be seen in the many trade, and diplomatic treaties that specifically address the 
territories in dispute.  Nationalism and territorial sovereignty, unfortunately, have 
muddied the waters and provided all parties some hoops to jump through, to placate 
domestic opinion.  It is obvious that not until several generations have passed will the 
issue of nationalism be resolved.  As for the territorial sovereignty issue, the following 
recommendations are made:184 
1. Japanese diplomats need to sit with each of its neighbors, either bilaterally 
or with an unbiased third party, and review all the documents.  From this 
position of knowledge will come understanding.  This has been done in 
the Northern Territories and Senkaku Islands. 
2. The parties must systematically go through the documents and work 
through their issues until agreements can be made.  In those instances 
where there is a contentious issue, or “hot spot,” it should be shelved so as 
not to interrupt the process of cooperation.  This has been accomplished 
with all of the disputes considering the diplomatic and economic relations 
that have been ongoing. 
3. The “hot spots” must be boxed off to prevent any further antagonism of 
the situation.  This will not only prevent further chances of conflict, but 
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will also deny each other the opportunity of realizing gains from the 
territory.  In the case of residents, like in the Northern Territories, this can 
be unrealistic.  However, by removing the resource revenues, this could 
provide an incentive to resolve the dispute. 
4. Throughout this process, a search for commonality and understanding is 
paramount.  The idea of not leaving until a resolution is found should be 
the ultimate goal.  Negotiating to seek compromise will allow the 
participants to reach a solution.  Ultimately, joint gain is preferable to the 
cumulative loss these countries would realize in the form of trade, 
diplomatic ties, and armaments.185  
These principles may not be as autocratic as in pre-modern Japan’s centralized 
governments.  However, they provide Japanese decision makers with the opportunity to 
use its concept of communication and cooperation to achieve harmony in the territorial 
realm.   
If Japanese leaders could take the lead on these disputes, the Japanese may be 
able to turn international opinion in their favor and grant Japan a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council.  Some have argued that the government of Japan would have to 
trade territory for the seat.  It could be argued that the Japanese government does not 
need to give up territory at all.  With the exception of the Northern Territories, over 
which Japanese officials were willing to accept a compromise in 1951, the territories in 
question provide resources and nationalist pride.  The resource issue appears to have been 
settled and as generations pass, there is the chance that nationalism will wane over time.  
The Security Council seat and/or other opportunities may even assist in focusing 
Japanese nationalist pride elsewhere.  Ultimately, any action other than peaceful 
resolution that favors all parties will lead to instability in the region, and a continued 
mistrust of Japanese intentions. 
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C. FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
Given the government of Japan’s immediate desire for peace and stability in the 
region, it is expected that Japanese policy makers will promote multilateral forums to 
compliment the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.  This will include an increased role 
of Japanese integration in the UN as well as closer economic integration with in the 
region.186  This will also include a modernization and re-fitting of its SDF and the 
possible amending of its Constitution as well.  In the meantime, Japanese officials will 
improve efforts in Japanese intelligence functions such that they have a capability to 
respond to early danger signs, and ability to broaden its scope of response will not only 
enhance its ability to defend itself but also assist in the stability of the region.187  The 
Japanese Defense Agency must deal with technological advances in military 
communications as well as U.S.-Japan joint research on a missile defense system.  The 
NDPO will also respond to public expectations for the SDF to be sent to areas hit by 
natural disasters.  SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations will also be stressed 
in the outline.188 
This plan for modernization should occur in concert with the existing U.S.-Japan 
bilateral relationship.  While the U.S.-Japan security alliance is not a treaty such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Japanese bilateral agreement with the United 
States should be developed into a more active and constructive relationship.  This should 
include improving support to the U.S. government through intelligence sharing, joint-
training off of the Japanese islands, having compatible equipment interfaces, and an 
Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA).189  This will not only improve the 
relationship between the two countries but also direct modernization efforts toward peace 
and stability in Japan. 
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D. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Since its westernization in the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese leaders have been 
playing catch-up in the realm of international politics.  Consequently, the flexibility and 
ability to adapt by these leaders has allowed them to walk between the East and the West.  
Unfortunately, Japan has not been able to claim a home in either sphere successfully.  
Given Japanese uniqueness, however, Tokyo would not want it any other way.  Against 
the background of the delicate balance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese 
leadership will need to make a stand that will conflict with both spheres.  Existing 
American policy would indicate that the United States may not officially understand why 
the Japanese seek a closer relationship with Beijing than Taipei.  Nor will the Chinese 
accept the Japanese need for a regular military force.  Ultimately, Japan will stand on its 
own - neither eastern nor western, just Japanese.   
Japanese leaders manipulated Chinese philosophy and used it to develop Japan’s 
national character.  When this Asian model was challenged by western imperialism, the 
Japanese adopted western thoughts on international relations into a nationalistic cause to 
rid themselves of subjugation and ultimately compete as equals during World War II.  It 
was during the occupation that Japanese leaders further adapted a national character, 
defined through international trade and commerce.  This approach was cultivated through 
the Cold War.  At the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government found itself in a 
new age of self-exploration.  The recession of the 1990s and Asia monetary crisis in 1997 
has forced Japanese decision makers to step back and re-evaluate Japan’s status in the 
world.   
As in the past, though, Japanese leaders will re-establish Japan in the world.  
Japan will be a regional leader that will depend on sharing its role with the governments 
of China and Australia.  As a co- leader, Japan will work with the United States and its 
neighbors in Asia, to include Russia, in developing a regional framework to encompass 
trade and security.  Japan will be able to do this due to its willingness to use its military 
forces as both a deterrent and facilitator similar to the United States’ role during the Cold 
war.  However, the difference will be that this Asian Pacific League will be based more 
on trade than security.  The comprehensive security aspect will be used to respond to 
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regional conflicts that traditional forms of conflict management fail to address.  The 
government of Japan, with those of Australia, and China, will provide the de facto police 
forces necessary to provide peace and stability in a very large and diverse region of the 
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APPENDIX A.  JAPANESE INTERDEPENDENCE BY REGIONS 
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